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ABSTRACT
Jurors exercise unique legal power when they are asked
to decide whether to sentence someone to death. The Supreme
Court emphasizes the central role of the jury’s moral
judgment in making this sentencing decision, noting that it is
the jurors who are best able to “express the conscience of the
community on the ultimate question of life or death.” 1 Many
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1. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
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lower courts nevertheless narrow the range of admissible
evidence at the mitigation phase of a capital trial, insisting
on a standard of legal relevance that interferes with the jury’s
ability to exercise the very moral judgment the Supreme Court
has deemed essential.
Combining moral theory and original empirical evidence,
this Article breaks new ground by linking these to a legal
framework that gives full effect to the Supreme Court’s vision
of the jury. Aided by a novel dataset of federal capital jury
verdict forms, this Article focuses on three types of evidence
frequently excluded in state and federal courts: the impact of
the defendant’s execution on loved ones, co-participant
sentences, and the government’s negligent facilitation of the
murder.
The data show that jurors consistently find all three
forms of evidence highly relevant to their mitigation
deliberations. Further, two of these—execution impact
evidence and co-participant sentences—have a statistically
significant correlation with the jurors’ sentencing decision.
This Article’s empirical and moral account of juror behavior
strongly supports expanding the admissibility of this evidence
to reflect the Supreme Court’s evolution in defining the
relevance of mitigating evidence as a moral—rather than
legalistic—question, appropriately recognizing the jury’s
normative role.
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INTRODUCTION
The death penalty is a legal criminal punishment in most
American states, as well as in the American military and
federal jurisdictions. 2 All together, more than 2,500 men and
women presently await execution on death rows across the
country. 3 The federal government recently reinvigorated its
use of the death penalty, executing twelve men and one
woman between July 2020 and January 2021 4 after a
seventeen-year hiatus. 5 Perhaps politically invigorated by
the federal executions, a new confidence that execution
methods will pass constitutional muster, or an apparent
slowing of the COVID-19 pandemic, states have returned to
scheduling executions, some for the first time in a while. 6
2. See DEBORAH FINS, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., DEATH ROW
U.S.A. 1 (Spring 2021) https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/uploads/DRUSA
Spring2021.pdf.
3. Death Row Overview, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo
.org/death-row/overview (last visited Dec. 30, 2021).
4. Federal Execution Updates, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://death
penaltyinfo.org/stories/federal-execution-updates (last visited Dec. 30, 2021).
5. Madeleine Carlisle, What to Know About Lisa Montgomery, The First
Woman Executed by the Federal Government in Nearly 70 Years, TIME (Jan. 13,
2021,
11:26
AM),
https://time.com/5914533/lisa-montgomery-executioncoronavirus-death-penalty/; Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
Federal Government to Resume Capital Punishment After Nearly Two Decade
Lapse (July 25, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-governmentresume-capital-punishment-after-nearly-two-decade-lapse.
6. Lauren Castle, Arizona Ready to Execute Death Row Inmates, Corrections
Director Says, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Mar. 5, 2021, 8:46 PM), https://www.azcentral.com
/story/news/local/arizona/2021/03/05/arizona-ready-resume-death-row-execut
ions-corrections-chief-says/4599281001/ (first effort to resume executions since
2014); Missouri Execution Date Set for Ernest Johnson, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June
29, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/mo-state-wire-michael-brown-executionsb8c1a45c6436382c32d382cad0fbd451 (Missouri’s last execution was in May
2020); Ken Ritter, Judge in Vegas OK’s Setting Late-July Nevada Execution Date,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 7, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/nv-state-wire-
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While popular enthusiasm for the death penalty has
diminished over the past twenty years, 7 it remains an
important and distinctive part of American criminal
punishment with over one hundred prisoners executed in the
past five years. 8 The United States is the only Western
industrialized country to retain the death penalty. 9 Further,
the United States is alone in relying on jurors to decide
whether to sentence a person to death. 10 The continued
nevada-executions-government-and-politics-8c50959d97d45d065c44dc500439
d59c (Nevada’s last scheduled execution in 2018); Catherine Welch, South
Carolina Prepares to Bring Firing Squads to Death Row, WFAE 90.7 (July 14,
2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.wfae.org/south-carolina-news/2021-07-14/southcarolina-prepares-to-bring-firing-squads-to-death-row (ten year pause in South
Carolina for executions because of problem accessing lethal injection chemicals);
Steven Hale, Tennessee Is Seeking an Execution Date for the Only Woman on the
State’s Death Row, NASHVILLE SCENE (June 8, 2021), https://www.nashvillescene
.com/news/citylimits/tennessee-is-seeking-an-execution-date-for-the-onlywoman-on-the-state-s-death/article_46f6ca2e-b4bf-56c2-b39f-30f2d2e965e2.html
(Tennessee paused executions because of pandemic; first woman scheduled for
execution in more than a decade.); Alabama, Mississippi Take Preparatory Steps
to Resume Executions, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Aug. 11, 2021),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/alabama-mississippi-take-preparatory-stepsto-resume-executions.
7. Frank R. Baumgartner, If Biden Abolishes the Federal Death Penalty,
He’ll Have More Support Than You Think, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2021, 7:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/08/03/if-biden-abolishes-federaldeath-penalty-hell-have-more-support-than-you-think/; Death Penalty, GALLUP,
https://news.gallup.com/poll/1606/Death-Penalty.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2021)
(showing Americans’ support for the death penalty decline from 1936 to 2019);
Mark Berman, Most Americans Now Favor Life in Prison over the Death Penalty
for Convicted Murderers, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.washington
post.com/national/most-americans-now-favor-life-in-prison-over-the-deathpenalty-for-convicted-murderers/2019/11/24/921b7a64-0d4d-11ea-97aca7ccc8dd1ebc_story.html.
8. Executions in the United States, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/executions-overview (last visited Dec. 20,
2021).
9. DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN
AGE OF ABOLITION 11 (2012). In 2019, the United States executed twenty-two
prisoners, putting it in sixth place of executing countries after China, Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Iraq, and Egypt. AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL GLOBAL
REPORT: DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS 2019, at 52 (2020).
10. At this time, all American death penalty jurisdictions except for Montana
and Nebraska give defendants the right to have a jury make all decisions related
to death sentencing. Maria T. Kolar, “Finding” a Way to Complete the Ring of
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salience of the death penalty underscores the need to
understand how jurors make these sentencing decisions.
Jurors are central figures in the American death penalty.
The Supreme Court has made clear that, as the death
penalty is qualitatively different from sentences of
incarceration in its harshness and finality, jurors’ connection
to community values makes them an essential part of death
sentencing. The Eighth Amendment guarantees capital
jurors can consider a wide range of information as they
generate their “reasoned moral response” 11 to evidence in
sentencing a particular individual. But while mitigating
evidence is recognized as a cornerstone of capital trials and
the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,
what constitutes evidence relevant to mitigation remains
contested in both state and federal courts.
These jurisprudential debates over what is “relevant” to
capital jurors at sentencing are devoid of systematic
empirical evidence, 12 while empirical scholarship on what
matters to jurors in sentencing has not connected the data to
the legal question of relevance. 13 That is what this Article
Capital Jury Sentencing, 95 DENV. L. REV. 671, 721–22 (2018). While China is
expanding lay participation in criminal adjudication, these participants are not
solely responsible for deciding whether to sentence a defendant to death.
Guodong Du & Yanru Chen, Does the Jury Exist in China?, CHINA JUST.
OBSERVER (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.chinajusticeobserver.com/a/does-the-juryexist-in-china.
11. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 322 (1989), abrogated on other grounds
by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and holding modified by Boyde v.
California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990), and Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990).
12. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978); Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 113–15 (1982); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8 (1986);
Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 288–89 (2004).
13. For overviews of social science research on capital jury decision-making,
see Dennis J. Devine & Christopher E. Kelly, Life or Death: An Examination of
Jury Sentencing with the Capital Jury Project Database, 21 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 393, 394–96 (2015); Leona D. Jochnowitz, How Capital Jurors Respond to
Mitigating Evidence of Defendant’s Mental Illness, Retardation, and Situational
Impairments: An Analysis of the Legal and Social Science Literature, 47 CRIM. L.
BULL. 839, 839–40 (2011). Articles directed toward a legal audience have
concentrated on urging structural, voir dire, and jury instruction reforms. See,
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does. It presents unique data regarding juror concerns in
capital sentencing and links it to a legal framework for
deciding whether to admit proposed mitigating evidence.
This Article argues that, to take seriously the essential
and special role of the jury in death sentencing, both state
and federal trial courts must reframe their definition of
relevant evidence to reflect the complexity of the jury’s
normative vision. Rather than ask whether evidence is
relevant to the defendant or the offense—categories the
Supreme Court articulated over forty years ago in striking
down mandatory death sentences 14—these courts should
recognize how the Court’s view of mitigation has evolved over
the past four decades. This evolution requires courts to ask
instead whether the evidence is relevant to the jury’s moral
decision-making with respect to that defendant. What may
seem like a nuanced distinction is in fact a substantial one.
We make not simply a theoretical argument, but also an
empirical one, as we marshal evidence from actual jury
deliberations. Using an original dataset of 211 capital trial
verdict forms from 176 juries, this Article analyzes capital
jurors’ responses to three specific areas of evidentiary
contestation—execution
impact
evidence,
non-death
sentences for co-participants in the crime, and government
action or inaction that facilitated the murder—using the
verdict forms jurors completed in the course of their
deliberations. Federal capital verdict forms, unlike most
jurisdictions, generally list all mitigating factors and ask
e.g., Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt is
Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation is No Excuse, 66
BROOK. L. REV. 1011, 1061–62 (2001); Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and
Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538,
1538 (1998); see also John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Scott E. Sundby,
Competent Capital Representation: The Necessity of Knowing and Heeding What
Jurors Tell Us About Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1035, 1036–37 (2008)
(arguing for improvements in capital defense practices); William S. Geimer &
Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten
Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 54 (1988) (pointing out the
impossibility of a constitutionally administered death penalty).
14. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303–04 (1976).
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jurors to indicate their numerical vote on each. Here is an
example: 15

If the defendant were tried in one of the many
jurisdictions that exclude, for example, evidence of execution
impact on his family, 16 the jury would not have the
opportunity to formally discuss and reflect on this
information in deciding on the sentence, as Lashaun Casey’s
jury did in Item 17.
At the end of the mitigation section, many forms 17 also
provide juries with opportunities to write in their own
mitigating factors. In the following example, the entire jury
wrote in as an “additional mitigating factor” the fact that the
Government sought to execute the defendant, Steven
Northington, while permitting a co-participant, Lamont

15. Special Verdict Form at 7, United States v. Casey, Crim. No. 05-277 (ADC)
(D.P.R. Apr. 11, 2013).
16. Most states and two federal circuits exclude this evidence. See infra
Section IV.A.1.
17. As discussed infra Section I.B, seventy-three verdict forms contained
mitigators the jury had written onto the form.
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Lewis, to escape this fate. 18

Because these verdict forms are so detailed with respect
to aggravation and mitigation, they offer an unparalleled
window into what the jury valued. In addition to this
remarkable detail, these data are exceptional insofar as they
constitute direct evidence of jury decision-making, unlike
prior capital jury research that relies on indirect measures of
jurors’ reactions to mitigating evidence, either through posttrial interviews with a subset of jurors, 19 archival coding of
sentence predictors, 20 or mock jury research. 21 By examining
18. Special Verdict Form for Penalty Phase at 14, United States v.
Northington, Crim. Action No. 07-550-05 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2013).
19. The Capital Jury Project (CJP) is by far the most common source of data
regarding jurors’ thoughts about mitigation. The CJP conducted lengthy posttrial interviews with approximately four jurors from each capital case. For
examples of CJP scholarship, see Bentele & Bowers, supra note 13, at 1017;
Garvey, supra note 13, at 1540. Post-trial interviews can be biased by who opts
to participate, jurors’ lack of insight into the factors that influenced them, and
their desire to minimize doubt and/or justify their final result. See Mark Costanzo
& Sally Costanzo, Jury Decision Making in the Capital Penalty Phase: Legal
Assumptions, Empirical Findings, and a Research Agenda, 16 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 185, 190–91 (1992). Further, because the law allows jurors to consider
(and weigh) mitigation independently of other jurors, interviews with a subset of
jurors may not reflect how non-interviewed jurors viewed mitigation. See McKoy
v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 441 (1990) (striking down jury instruction
requiring jurors to be unanimous in finding certain evidence mitigating).
20. See, e.g., David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, Catherine M. Grosso &
Aaron M. Christ, Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the
Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska Experience
(1973–1999), 81 NEB. L. REV. 486 passim (2002). In addition to statistical issues,
see generally Richard Berk, Azusa Li & Laura J. Hickman, Statistical Difficulties
in Determining the Role of Race in Capital Cases: A Re-Analysis of Data from the
State of Maryland, 21 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 365 (2005). This work
presents a largely static portrait of mitigation, telling us whether, for example,
the totality of mitigation predicts verdicts but not how jurors react to evidence on
a more granular level.
21. See, e.g., Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Discrimination and Instructional
Comprehension: Guided Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty, 24 LAW
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actual jurors’ responses to mitigation, this dataset helps
answer the question courts have only guessed at: what
information do jurors think is mitigating as they decide on a
sentence? Not only do we identify that jurors find evidence of
execution impact, co-participant sentences, and government
negligence mitigating, but, as discussed infra in Section I.C,
we also find that the first two types of evidence correlate with
outcomes. The inclusion of this evidence on the verdict form
is significantly associated with a greater likelihood of life
sentences as compared to death sentences.
Empirical data alone, however, cannot resolve the
constitutional question. 22 Indeed, as we discuss below, the
simple fact that a juror may be swayed by a particular piece
of information should not be the standard for relevance in a
capital sentencing. Instead, we emphasize that these are
patterns of juror responses across cases that resonate with
important normative intuitions, with the “ordinary moral
thought,” 23 that we need jurors to bring to bear. Jurors’ finetuned appreciation of what matters when we punish is
precisely the democratic function the Framers intended. 24
While some courts persist in applying a legalistic analysis
that we contend is out of step with the Supreme Court’s

& HUM. BEHAV. 337, 337 (2000); Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Capital Jury
Deliberation: Effects on Death Sentencing, Comprehension, and Discrimination,
33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 481, 481 (2009); Margaret C. Stevenson, Bette L. Bottoms
& Shari S. S. Diamond, Jurors’ Discussions of a Defendant’s History of Child
Abuse and Alcohol Abuse in Capital Sentencing Deliberations, 16 PSYCH. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 1, 1 (2010). Mock jury research allows researchers to observe
participants’ deliberation. One may fairly ask whether people pretending to
sentence someone to death will ever approach the task the way actual jurors do.
Costanzo & Costanzo, supra note 19, at 188, 191.
22. Cf. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (Objective evidence does
not obviate need for Court to bring its own judgment to bear in deciding whether
the Eighth Amendment permits the death penalty for defendants with
intellectual disability.).
23. Joshua Kleinfeld, A Theory of Criminal Victimization, 65 STAN. L. REV.
1087, 1137 (2013).
24. See United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2375–76 (2019);
discussion infra Part II.
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jurisprudence, 25 our data show that jurors embrace the full
complexity of the moral decision they are making.
The Article proceeds in five parts. It first describes our
novel dataset of capital trial verdicts, as well as the legal
context of the federal death penalty. It then analyzes juror
responses to execution impact evidence, co-participants’ nondeath sentences, and government negligence. Part II
explains the jury’s central constitutional function in criminal
cases generally and capital sentencing particularly. Part III
traces the evolution of the Supreme Court’s cases explaining
the role and content of mitigating evidence in a death penalty
trial. Part IV explains specifically why some courts refuse to
admit the three contested categories of evidence based on
their interpretation of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. It
then contextualizes jurors’ responses to this evidence with
theories of moral decision-making. In Part V, we outline a
path forward, specifying the principles courts should use in
admitting this evidence and proposing rules in step with the
Supreme Court caselaw, jurors’ moral decision-making, and
juries’ essential, constitutional normative role.
I.

FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY CASES AS A UNIQUE WINDOW
INTO WHAT JURORS FIND MITIGATING

Mechanically, jurors in death penalty cases make two
decisions. First, they determine whether the defendant is
guilty of capital murder. Then, if the jury finds the defendant
guilty, it decides, after a separate evidentiary proceeding and
argument, whether the defendant should be executed or
sentenced to life in prison. 26 In reaching this decision, jurors
consider evidence for the death penalty (“aggravating
evidence”) and against the death penalty (“mitigating
evidence”) in that particular case.

25. See also Emad H. Atiq & Erin L. Miller, The Limits of Law in the
Evaluation of Mitigating Evidence, 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 167, 170 (2018).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3593.
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Even the most conservative jurists read the Supreme
Court’s cases to require the admission of evidence of “any
aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death.” 27 (Based on the cases
that announced this principle, we call this the
Lockett/Eddings paradigm.) The evolution and legal limits
of mitigating evidence is described in Part III. In this Part,
we outline only how jurors consider mitigating evidence in
federal death penalty cases on our way to describing our
dataset. We then present our results regarding how actual
jurors have responded to evidence involving execution
impact, a co-participant’s sentence, and government
negligence. These results demonstrate the richness of the
data.
A. Mitigation and the Modern Federal Death Penalty
While most death sentences in the United States stem
from convictions in state courts, a growing number have been
imposed in federal court for violations of federal criminal
law. 28 In the modern death penalty era, which began in 1976
when the Supreme Court found the death penalty could be
administered constitutionally, 29 two federal statutes govern
the federal death penalty, the 1988 Continuing Criminal
Enterprise (CCE) statute 30 and the 1994 Federal Death

27. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (Burger, C.J.,
a Nixon nominee, joined by three fellow Justices in part III of the decision,
discussing the constitutionality of Ohio’s death penalty statute). As discussed
infra Part III, a majority of the Court embraced this rule in Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 109 (1982).
28. Growth in Federal Death Row Population, FED. CAP. HABEAS PROJECT,
https://2255.capdefnet.org/General-Statistics/Growth-Federal-Death-RowPopulation (Dec. 20, 2021) (showing federal death row grew from one to sixty-two
prisoners between 1991 and 2018).
29. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976).
30. Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7001(a),
102 Stat. 4181, 4387 (codified as 21 U.S.C. § 848(r) (1988)).
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Penalty Act (FDPA). 31 The CCE statute targets so-called
“drug kingpins,” directors of large-scale drug operations 32
who “intentionally kill[] or . . . cause[] [an] intentional
killing.” 33 The FDPA both created new offenses that could be
punished with the death penalty 34 and expanded the
sentencing options for existing federal offenses. 35
Federal death prosecutions generally conform to
Supreme Court precedent with respect to, for example,
bifurcated proceedings and mens rea, 36 but the punishment
verdict forms are distinctive. The form asks the factfinder—
ordinarily the same judge or jury who found the defendant
guilty 37—to make essentially two types of decisions before
31. Federal Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1959
(reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1801). For a detailed comparison of the two
statutes, see Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some
Thoughts About the Department of Justice’s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 392–
405 (1999).
32. Specifically, the statute applies where there is a “continuing series of
violations” of federal narcotics laws, committed by the defendant “in concert with
five or more other persons,” with whom the defendant “occupies a position of . . .
management,” and from which the defendant obtains “substantial income or
resources.” 21 U.S.C. § 848(c).
33. 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1).
34. For example, drive-by shootings could now be punishable by death if the
person “in furtherance or to escape detection of a major drug offense and with the
intent to intimidate, harass, injure, or maim, fires a weapon into a group of 2 or
more persons” commits first degree murder. 18 U.S.C. § 36.
35. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2119(3) (adding death penalty option to existing
carjacking prohibition).
36. The FDPA permits the death penalty for two non-homicidal offenses,
namely for defendants charged with extensive drug dealing or participating in
very extensive continuing criminal enterprises who have only “attempt[ed]” to
kill. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(b)(1)–(2). These provisions are suspect in light of the Court’s
decisions in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that punishing
the rape of an adult woman with the death penalty violates the Eight
Amendment’s proportionality requirement) and Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S.
407, 418 (2008) (holding the same for child rape where the crime did not result,
and was not intended to result, in the death of the child). So far, the Department
of Justice has not sought the death penalty under either provision. The
recklessness mens rea is also arguably higher than that required by the Court in
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157–58 (1987). Little, supra note 31, at 394 n.255.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b). We refer only to the jury, as that is the focus of this
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determining the sentence. First, the jurors must
unanimously agree that the government has proven certain
factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, they must review
and vote on a series of statements regarding the mitigating
evidence.
The sentencing decision is structured by the verdict
forms, which generally start by asking the jury to decide
whether the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the
time of the crime and acted with the requisite mental state. 38
If the jury agrees (again, unanimously), it next considers
aggravating factors established in the FDPA, such as
whether the defendant’s conduct was “heinous, cruel, and
depraved,” or whether the crime involved “substantial
planning and premeditation.” 39 If it cannot agree the
government has proven at least one statutory aggravating
factor beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury is instructed to
end its deliberations. 40
When the jury is persuaded unanimously with respect to
age, mens rea, and at least one statutory aggravating factor,
it may consider aggravating factors not in the statute, such
as the defendant’s substantial criminal record, lack of

study.
38. See, e.g., infra Appendix (Verdict at 1–3, United States v. Richardson, No.
1:08-CR-139 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 26, 2012)).
39. See id. (Verdict at 4, United States v. Richardson, No. 1:08-CR-139 (N.D.
Ga. Apr. 26, 2012)). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d).
40. See infra Appendix (Verdict at 5, United States v. Richardson, No. 1:08CR-139 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 26, 2012)). In finding the government has proven a
statutory aggravator, the jury has found the defendant “eligible” for the death
penalty. After it finds the defendant eligible for the death penalty, it then
“selects” the appropriate sentence based on its assessment of the mitigating
evidence. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878–79 (1983). The Court has explained
that the eligibility determination “channel[s] and limit[s] the jury’s discretion to
ensure that the death penalty is a proportionate punishment and therefore not
arbitrary or capricious in its imposition. In contrast, in the selection phase, [the
Court has] emphasized the need for a broad inquiry into all relevant mitigating
evidence to allow an individualized determination.” Buchanan v. Angelone, 522
U.S. 269, 275–76 (1998).
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remorse, or future dangerousness. 41 Regardless of its
findings regarding non-statutory aggravation, the jury then
proceeds to consider mitigating factors, which must be
proved by only a preponderance of the evidence and which
are not subject to any unanimity requirement. 42
The FDPA lists seven types of mitigation, as well as a
“catch-all,” that the jury “shall consider” in sentencing. 43 The
Sixth Circuit divided these factors into three domains: the
defendant’s culpability, 44 the defendant’s background, 45 and
a “catch-all”—“other factors in the defendant’s background,
record, or character or any other circumstance of the offense
that mitigate against imposition of the death sentence.” 46
The federal capital verdict form guides the jury’s
deliberation by specifically directing jurors to consider and
vote on a series of mitigating factors in reaching their
decision. 47 While some asked jurors to vote “yes” or “no” on
each mitigating factor, most 48 forms in our study asked
jurors to indicate the number of juror votes per each
mitigating factor. In addition, as noted in the Introduction,
41. See infra Appendix (Verdict at 6, United States v. Richardson, No. 1:08CR-139 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 26, 2012)).
42. See id. (Verdict at 8, United States v. Richardson, No. 1:08-CR-139 (N.D.
Ga. Apr. 26, 2012)).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a).
44. These are “[i]mpaired capacity[;]” “unusual and substantial duress;” “the
defendant’s participation was relatively minor;” “[a]nother defendant or
defendants, equally culpable in the crime, will not be punished by death;” “[t]he
defendant committed the offense under severe mental or emotional
disturbance[;]” and “[t]he victim consented to the criminal conduct that resulted
in the victim’s death.” United States v. Gabrion, 719 F.3d 511, 524 (6th Cir. 2013)
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(1)–(4), (6)–(7)).
45. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(5) (“The defendant did not have a
significant prior history of other criminal conduct.”)).
46. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(8)). This language mirrors the Supreme
Court’s language in Lockett and Eddings, discussed infra Part III.
47. See infra Appendix (Verdict at 8–13, United States v. Richardson, No.
1:08-CR-139 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 26, 2012)).
48. Of the verdict forms that reached mitigation, 93% asked jurors to record
numerical votes for each mitigating factor rather than a “yes” or “no.”
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at the end of the mitigation section, many forms 49 provided
juries with opportunities to write in their own mitigating
factors by including in the verdict form blank lines
immediately after instructions that jurors may offer their
own factors. 50
After going through and voting on all the mitigating
factors, jurors are asked to vote on the sentence. To sentence
to death, the jury must be unanimous. 51 The jury may also
vote unanimously for a sentence of life in prison without the
possibility of parole. If the jury cannot come to a unanimous
decision, the sentence automatically defaults to a sentence of
life in prison without the possibility of parole. 52
B. Description of Dataset
As mentioned above, the federal capital verdict forms
offer exceptional, direct evidence of jury decision-making,
especially in a capital context. Further, with rare
exception, 53 prior studies have also not asked about jurors’
reactions to the types of mitigating evidence we explore here.
By including both jurors’ numerical votes on mitigators,
as well as jurors’ own proffered factors via any written-in
factors, the data provide a direct measure of what concepts
constitute mitigation in the jurors’ eyes. We can analyze the
level of support jurors give to the categories of evidence some
courts have rejected as irrelevant or immaterial and also see
whether jurors endorse these factors as mitigating by raising
49. As discussed infra Section I.B, 84% of forms offered this opportunity;
seventy-three verdict forms contained mitigators the jury had written onto the
form.
50. Special Verdict Form for Penalty Phase at 14, United States v.
Northington, Crim. Action No. 07-550-05 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2013).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e).
52. See infra Appendix (Verdict at 15–17, United States v. Richardson, No.
1:08-CR-139 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 26, 2012) (showing sentencing options)).
53. See Breanna Boppre & Monica K. Miller, How Victim and Execution
Impact Statements Affect Mock Jurors’ Perceptions, Emotions, and Verdicts, 9
VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 413, 427–28 (2014).
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these issues on their own. The data further permit us to ask
if these areas of mitigation generate substantially less
support than mitigation that is not legally contested, namely
that relating to the background of the defendant or
circumstances of the crime. This illuminates whether jurors
make same distinctions some courts make in deciding what
information qualifies as mitigating and what does not. The
“write-in” information provided by jurors is particularly rich
insofar as it reflects the jurors’ decision that certain
information not included in the verdict form merited specific
mention.
The Federal Death Penalty Resource Counsel website
has verdict forms from almost all federal capital trials held
between 1991 and 2018. 54 We downloaded all verdict forms
available on the site, totaling 223 files representing verdict
forms for 226 defendants (in three cases, juries assessed
mitigation for two different defendants on one verdict form).
We eliminated forms that did not reflect jury verdicts, did
not list the factors jurors were asked to consider, or in which
jurors did not reach mitigation. 55 This left 211 verdict
forms. 56 Because some crimes involved multiple defendants,
54. Penalty Phase Verdict Forms, FED. DEATH PENALTY RES. COUNS.,
https://fdprc.capdefnet.org/verdict-forms (last visited Dec. 20, 2021). Where
courts have ordered verdict forms filed under seal, those are not posted on the
website. Email from Barry J. Fisher, Fed. Cap. App. Res. Couns., Fed. Cap. Res.
Couns. (Mar. 29, 2019, 4:41 PM) (on file with authors). As September 29, 2021,
the federal government has prosecuted 239 trials of 305 defendants. Current
Statistics re Use of Federal Death Penalty, FED. DEATH PENALTY RES. COUNS.,
https://fdprc.capdefnet.org/doj-activity/statistics/current-statistics-re-use-offederal-death-penalty-february-2017 (last visited Dec. 20, 2021).
55. One form (for Oklahoma City bomber Terry Nichols) was a guilt/innocence
verdict form, rather than a sentencing form; two involved bench trials; three had
no mitigators on the form; and in nine trials, the jury did not reach mitigation
because it made factual findings that determined the sentence (e.g., it did not
find a necessary statutory aggravator). See Penalty Phase Verdict Forms, FED.
DEATH PENALTY RES. COUNS., https://fdprc.capdefnet.org/verdict-forms (last
visited Dec. 20, 2021).
56. For six of these, the jury reached mitigation but did not provide any
specific mitigation votes. (In four verdict forms, the instructions permitted jurors
to not disclose these votes; two forms did not provide lines to report votes.)
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there are more forms than juries: 211 forms come from 176
unique juries. All told, these verdict forms provided jurors
with 7,842 mitigating factors to vote on, 5,017 of which were
unique and not repeated across multiple counts.
Jurors also had the opportunity to write in their own
mitigating factors in 178 forms from 150 unique juries (84%
of the total forms, 85% of all juries). 57 Four-in-ten juries took
advantage of the opportunity to add their own mitigating
factors, writing in 149 mitigators that were non-redundant
across multiple counts. 58
Trained coders reviewed the mitigating factors on each
form and classified the content of the factor the jury
considered into categories we developed. These reflected
broad domains of mitigation (e.g., childhood/background
factors, mental state factors, and other contextualizing
factors) and sub-categories within each of those broad
domains (e.g., parental physical abuse, parental neglect,
limited schooling). 59
C. Results and Discussion
In analyzing the jury verdicts, we focused on jurors’
reactions to evidence of execution impact, co-participant
Because we cannot guess which mitigators these juries would have endorsed, in
analyses that rely on information about votes, results reflect only the 205 cases
that had vote information. Otherwise, we use the full 211 cases. We indicate
whether the presence or absence of these six cases changes our analyses.
57. We define “opportunity” as blank lines appearing in the form with
instructions that jurors may offer their own factors. See, e.g., supra text
accompanying notes 17–18; infra Appendix (Verdict at 12–13, United States v.
Richardson, No. 1:08-CR-139 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 26, 2012)). Seven of the “no
opportunity” juries had a line of mitigation that said, commonly, “Other
mitigating factor(s) found by at least one juror” (precise wording varied), and
these seven juries indicated “0” votes. This suggests these groups likely would
not have written in a factor, even given an opportunity.
58. Seventy-three verdict forms contained write-ins, i.e., 41% of the 178 forms
provided an opportunity for write-in. If we include the seven cases that were not
provided with blank lines to write in a mitigator, but that voted “0” for “other,”
the proportion is 39.4%.
59. The codebook is available from the authors upon request.

2021]

THE COMPLEXITIES OF CONSCIENCE

1255

sentencing, and government negligence for two reasons.
First, as discussed in Part IV, they are sites of significant
legal contestation (especially execution impact and coparticipant sentences). Second, they raise normative
questions of justice beyond the defendant’s individual moral
culpability, thereby bringing our central contention into
focus.
Our data show jurors endorsed mitigators in each of the
contested domains. Not only did they vote for these items on
the verdict form, but in some instances, they wrote them onto
the form, suggesting this information was particularly
salient to the jurors who voted for that mitigator.
1. Execution Impact Evidence
“Execution impact” evidence (EIE) generally consists of
witnesses (usually family members) who testify to the harm
they would suffer if the defendant were executed. Our coding
identified two types of execution impact: “Effect of death
sentence on defendant’s children” or “Others (besides
children) would be strongly negatively affected (e.g.,
traumatized) by defendant’s death (e.g., spouse/girlfriend,
parents).” Jurors voted on execution impact mitigating
factors in more than half (111 out of 211) of the cases we
analyzed.
Execution impact mitigators notably tended to garner
more votes than other mitigating factors. The mean vote for
non-EIE mitigators was 5.2 votes, while for EIE mitigators,
the mean was 7.95, a statistically significant difference. 60
Recognizing that an individual jury may be generally more
(or less) receptive to mitigation, and that each jury records
multiple votes on mitigation on the completed verdict form,
we ran regression models to account for this structure of the
data. 61 Accounting for this aspect of the data did not change
60. Based on a t-test of means, t = 9.81 (p <.0001).
61. Social scientists refer to this as a “nested structure,” i.e., multiple
mitigators are contained, or nested, within the same jury and therefore are not
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the result: mitigators describing EIE continued to garner
more votes, on average, 1.6 more votes than non-EIE
mitigators. 62 This difference was also statistically significant
(p < .0001).
Not only do jurors tend to be more supportive of
execution impact mitigators generally, cases with EIE have
higher votes on mitigation. We calculated the overall mean
votes on mitigation in all cases, and then compared the mean
votes in cases in which jurors considered EIE and those
where they did not. Cases that presented EIE mitigators to
the jurors had higher mean votes per mitigator. Individual
mitigators in cases that did not ask jurors to vote on
execution impact evidence had a mean of 4.99 votes per
mitigator, while cases that did ask them to vote on EIE had
a mean of 6.44 votes per mitigator. Again, this difference is
statistically significant (p < .0006). It is possible that cases
that have and do not have EIE mitigators differ in some other
way, but we cannot rule out the possibility that EIE
mitigation leads jurors to see other mitigating factors in a
different light.
Jurors also wrote in execution impact mitigators on their
own. Table 1 indicates what they wrote in, the number of
votes the write-in attracted, and the extent to which this
write-in was prompted by mitigators already on the verdict
form.

statistically independent. See generally STEPHEN W. RAUDENBUSH & ANTHONY S.
BRYK, HIERARCHICAL LINEAR MODELS: APPLICATIONS AND DATA ANALYSIS METHODS
(2d ed. 2002).
62. The results are essentially the same (1.61 more votes) when we control for
the other contested mitigators, i.e., co-participant non-death sentences and
government negligence.
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Execution Impact Evidence Write-ins
Write-In
(# votes)

Related to other
mitigators on form?
(# votes)

Lashaun
Casey

“Lashaun is the only
biological parent alive
for Christine, his
daughter.” (7)

“Lashaun’s life has value to his
family and loved ones.” (4)
“Lashaun can continue his
family relationships even while
serving a sentence of life
imprisonment without the
possibility of release.” (7)
“Lashaun’s family and loved
ones will suffer grief and loss if
he were executed.” (7) 63

James
Dinkins

“Impact of death
sentence on
defendant’s family.” (6)

“James Dinkins, while
incarcerated, maintains a
positive and supportive role in
his family.” (7) 64

Marvin
Gabrion

“Loss of defendant’s
life will be significant
to his family.” (12)

New. Not associated with other
factors on the form. 65

“Defendant’s sister will
be adversely affected if
she is executed.” (12)

Impact on different people
identified: “Defendant is the
mother of two children, who will
be adversely affected if the
defendant is executed.” (12)
“Defendant’s parents and
grandparents will be adversely
affected if she is executed.” (12) 66

Kristen
Gilbert

63. Special Verdict Form at 6–8, United States v. Casey, Crim. No. 05-277
(ADC) (D.P.R. Apr. 11, 2013).
64. Verdict Form at 10, United States v. James Dinkins, No. 09-4668 (D. Md.
June 30, 2009).
65. Penalty Phase Special Verdict Form at 8, United States v. Gabrion, No.
1:99-CR-76 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 18, 2002).
66. Special Verdict Form: Penalty Phase, Part II, at 4–5, United States v.
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Melvin
Gilbert

“Impact of death
sentence on
defendant’s family.” (4)

New to this defendant, but case
tried with James Dinkins, whose
form included family impact
mitigators. 67

Oscar
Grande

“Oscar Antonio
Grande’s family will be
adversely affected if he
is executed.” (7)

“That the execution of Oscar
Antonio Grande will have a
negative impact upon the life of
and directly cause emotional
trauma to his niece Tatiana
Flores.” (6) 68

Kenneth
Lighty

Steven
Northington

David
Runyon

“The effect of the
sentence on Nancy
Westfield
(Grandmother)” (10)
“A sentence of death
would adversely
impact the
Northington family.”
(12)
“Mark Runyon, brother
of David A. Runyon
will suffer emotional
harm if his brother is
executed.” (12)

New. Not associated with other
factors on the form. 69

“Mr. Northington has
maintained a relationship with
his family.” (9) 70
“David Anthony Runyon, Jr., son
of David Anthony Runyon, will
suffer emotional harm if his
father is executed.” (12)
“Suk Cha Runyon, the mother of
David Anthony Runyon, will
suffer emotional harm if her son
is executed.” (12) 71

Gilbert, No. 98-CR-30044-MAP (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 2001) (identical votes across
counts recorded at 6–9).
67. Verdict Form at 28–29, United States v. Gilbert, No. 09-4669 (D. Md. June
30, 2009). Tried by the same jury, co-defendant James Dinkins’s verdict form (but
not Gilbert’s) asked about the effect of execution on his family. Verdict Form at
10, United States v. James Dinkins, No. 09-4668 (D. Md. June 30, 2009).
68. Special Verdict Form at 21–22, United States v. Grande, 353 F. Supp. 2d
623 (E.D. Va. 2005) (No. 1:04CR283-A).
69. See Special Verdict Form at 8–9, United States v. Lighty, No. PJM-03-457
(D. Md. Nov. 10, 2005).
70. Special Verdict Form for Penalty Phase at 10, 13, United States v.
Northington, Crim. Action No. 07-550-05 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2013).
71. Special Verdict Form – Selection Phase at 4, United States v. Runyon, 667
F. Supp. 2d 648 (E.D. Va. 2009) (Crim. No. 4:08cr16).
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Christopher
Wills

“Crystal Wills will be
adversely affected due
to the loss of all
paternal contact if
Christopher Andaryl
Wills is executed.” (10)
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“Christopher Andaryl Wills’
fiancee, siblings, aunts and
uncles, nieces and nephews and
friends will be adversely affected
if he is executed.” (10)
“Christopher Andaryl Wills is
the father of two children, his
daughter, Crystal, and his stepdaughter, Nykia, both of whom
will suffer greatly if he is
executed.” (11)
“Christopher Andaryl Wills was
active in his daughter Crystal’s
life and her education as he
constantly asked her teacher
what he could do to help with
her studies and came to school to
see her.” (10) 72

Their votes show strong support for execution impact
evidence, as does the fact that jurors took the time during
deliberations to formulate their own mitigators in writing
and then vote on them. Sometimes they even shifted from
statements that related to the defendant (i.e., Northington
“maintained a relationship with this family,” for example) to
statements that focused on the family’s experience (i.e., “A
sentence of death would adversely impact the Northington
family.”). The fact that they sometimes used the opportunity
to refine the EIE mitigators presented on the verdict form
further demonstrates how salient they found this evidence.
Not only did jurors find it salient, but these data also
correlated with outcomes. As displayed in the chart below,
where juries were not asked to consider execution impact
evidence, they voted unanimously for death in 44.55% of
cases and unanimously for life in 36.63% of cases. In 18.81%
of cases, juries were unable to reach a unanimous decision.
For those that were asked to consider EIE, 30.91% returned
unanimous death verdicts; 35.45% returned unanimous life
72. Special Verdict Form at 6–8, United States v. Wills, No. 99-396-A (E.D.
Va. Oct. 4, 2001).
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verdicts; and 33.64% were unable to reach a unanimous
decision. Across these categories, the relationship between
the presence of EIE and verdict outcomes is statistically
significant. 73
TABLE 2.

Execution Impact Evidence and
Sentencing Outcomes.
Unanimous
death
verdict

Unanimous
LWOP
verdict

Non-unanimous
verdict
(with LWOP as
default sentence)

No EIE
mitigators

44.55%
(45 cases)

36.63%
(37 cases)

18.81%
(19 cases)

EIE
mitigator(s)

30.91%
(34 cases)

35.45%
(39 cases)

33.64%
(37 cases)

We conducted further tests to determine whether the
proportions of the outcomes changed when EIE mitigation
was (or was not) presented to the jury. We compared each
outcome to the combination of the other two—for example,
the likelihood of a death sentence versus any other non-death
verdict (i.e., combining unanimous and non-unanimous life
sentences), or the likelihood of a hung verdict versus any
other outcome (i.e., combining death sentences and
unanimous life sentences). As the patterns in the above chart
suggest, there is no difference in the likelihood that juries
will return a unanimous life imprisonment without parole
(LWOP) verdict among those cases that have EIE mitigators
and those that do not, compared to all other sentence
outcomes (p < .86). However, a death sentence is significantly
less likely (p < .05) when a jury has at least one EIE mitigator
(30.91%) compared to when it does not (44.55%). Likewise, a
hung verdict (which results in a LWOP sentence) is
73. Based on a chi-square test of association, χ2 (df = 2, N = 211) = 7.00 (p <
.05). When we omit the six cases where jurors did not report the number of votes
for each mitigator, the effect is slightly weaker, χ2 (df = 2, N = 205) = 5.80 (p <
.06).
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significantly more likely when the jury can vote on EIE
evidence (33.64%) than when it does not (18.81%). 74 Again,
these findings show only associations between EIE evidence
and outcomes. However, the patterns are intriguing and
suggest the impact of the defendant’s death sentence on
others is relevant to jurors.
2. Co-Participant’s Non-Death Sentence
The federal death sentencing statute explicitly identifies
a co-participant’s sentence as relevant. As a result, many
federal capital sentencing verdict forms ask jurors to
consider the mitigating value of a co-defendant’s non-death
penalty sentence. Therefore, federal capital sentencing
verdicts permit us to ask whether jurors in fact find a coparticipant’s non-death sentence mitigating.
Jurors considered mitigating factors coded as “[o]thers
who committed this particular crime have not been
punished/punished as harshly” frequently: 258 times 75
across 137 different cases, i.e., in 65% of all cases. Jurors
generally found this consideration mitigating. Of those
verdict forms asking for numerical votes, 71% had non-zero
votes. 76
Jurors treat information about sentences for coparticipants no differently than they treat other mitigating
factors. Unlike execution impact mitigators, the coparticipant mitigation did not attract a distinctly higher
level of support, but neither was it significantly lower. The
mean number of votes for mitigators that informed the jury
that the co-participant had been sentenced to prison was 5.48
74. χ2 (df = 1, N = 211) = 4.19 (p < .05) for death sentence analysis and χ2 (df
= 1, N = 211) = 5.94 (p < .05) for a non-unanimous outcome. When we omitted the
six cases the effect was weaker only in death-sentenced cases (p< .07).
75. These are repeated across counts. Including co-participant statements
that were redundant across counts, jurors responded to this mitigator 447 times.
76. Of the small number of verdict forms that asked jurors to record only
yes/no votes, fifteen of the twenty-two co-participant statements (or 68%) got a
“yes” vote and seven got a “no” vote.
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(SD = 4.72), while the mean for all other mitigating factors
was 5.32 (SD = 4.83). 77 Thus, we see that juries consider this
issue in the way they consider other factors directly related
to the characteristics of the defendant or circumstances of
the offense.
As with execution impact evidence, jurors also wrote in
mitigators regarding disparate sentencing.
TABLE 3.
Name

Vincent
Basciano

Co-Participant Sentences Write-Ins
Write-In
(# votes)

Related to other
mitigators on form?
(# votes)

“There are other
members of organized
crime that have
admitted to an equal
or greater number of
serious crimes that
are not facing the
death penalty, much
less incarcerated.”
(10)

“Dominick Cicale, Michael
Mancuso, and/or Anthony Aiello
are/is equally culpable in the
murder of Randolph Pizzolo,
and will not be punished by
death.” (12) 78

77. This is not a statistically significant difference (t = 0.74, p < .47). This
reflects the 224 instances where the verdict form indicated the number of votes
in support of these particular mitigating factors and excludes mitigators with no
answer or with only yes/no votes. Results are the same if we control for case-level
nesting as described supra note 61.
78. Special Verdict Form at 5–6, United States v. Basciano, 763 F. Supp. 2d
303 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 05-CR-060 (NGG)).
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Alexis
Candelario

“Wilfredo SanpritSantone (Rato) fired
shots at La Tómbola
and testified to his
participation on the
racketeering
enterprise and is not
currently facing any
charges.” (6)

Others mentioned along similar
lines but not this person:
“David Oquendo Rivas will not
face the death penalty for his
role in the murders at La
Tómbola.” (4)
“Braulio Ortiz Rodriguez
(Menor), who did not
participate in La Tómbola
murders, was not charged along
with Alexis Candelario Santana
in Count 1, as a member of the
racketeering enterprise. (Count
1 is not death penalty eligible.)”
(0) 79

Donna
Moonda

“Damian Bradford
only received 17 1/2
yrs with a possibility
of early release.” (12)

“[T]here was an equally
culpable defendant, Damien
Bradford, who will not be
punished by death.” (12) 80

“Lamont Lewis will
not be sentenced to
death for eleven
premeditated
murders.” (12)

“Lamont Lewis, an equally
culpable codefendant, will not
be punished by death for any of
the eleven premeditated
murders he committed and may
be freed after serving forty
years for the premeditated
murders he committed.” (0) 81

Steven
Northington

79. Special Verdict Form at 10–11, United States v. Candelario-Santana, 929
F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.P.R. 2013) (No. 09-427 (JAF)).
80. Special Verdict Forms at 9, 11, United States v. Moonda, No. 1:06 CR 395
(N.D. Ohio July 18, 2007) (juror votes identical in two other counts at 22–37).
81. Special Verdict Form for Penalty Phase at 13–14, United States v.
Northington, Crim. Action No. 07-550-05 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2013).
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These write-ins highlight the jurors’ attentiveness to this
issue of relative punishment. In two instances, jurors used
the write-in to expand and name those other culpable
persons besides those listed for them on the form. In the
other two instances, the jurors’ write-ins stated the inequity
of the situation more precisely than they saw it presented in
the verdict form. For example, with respect to Donna
Moonda’s equally culpable co-defendant, Damian Bradford,
the jury specifically identified his seventeen-and-a-half-year
sentence accompanied by the possibility of early release. For
Steven Northington, the jury rewrote the existing mitigator
to keep the portion about another person escaping the death
penalty for his eleven premeditated murders and delete the
speculative statement regarding that individual’s potential
release in forty years. The jury’s rewrite highlighted the
essential, specific unfairness of the co-participant’s sentence:
someone else who premeditated eleven deaths will not get a
death sentence. The rewrite had the support of every juror in
the case.
Again, we see not only support, but also jurors’ attention
to equally culpable others. On this topic, as with execution
impact, they offered their own take on sentence disparities.
This is evidence that jurors are troubled by sentencing
inequities and find those inequities relevant to their
sentencing task.
Finally, although co-participant mitigators were not
voted as significantly more (or less) mitigating than other
factors presented on the verdict form, the presence of at least
one co-participant mitigator on the verdict form proved to
have a significantly strong relationship with verdict
outcomes. 82

82. χ2 (df = 2, N = 211) = 21.35 (p < .0001). None of these analyses changed
substantially when we omitted the six cases that did not provide votes on
mitigators. See supra note 56.
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Co-Participant Sentence Evidence and
Sentencing Outcomes
Unanimous
death
verdict

Unanimous
LWOP
verdict

Non-unanimous
verdict
(with LWOP as
default sentence)

No coparticipant
mitigators

57.53%
(42 cases)

20.55%
(15 cases)

21.92%
(16 cases)

Has coparticipant
mitigator(s)

26.81%
(37 cases)

44.20%
(61 cases)

28.99%
(40 cases)

As the chart above indicates, juries that evaluated
verdict forms containing at least one co-participant mitigator
were more than twice as likely to return a unanimous LWOP
verdict than those juries that did not have such a factor as a
mitigator (44.20% vs. 20.55%). Likewise, juries with coparticipant mitigators were far less likely to return a death
sentence (26.81% vs. 57.53%). We do not claim that coparticipant mitigation causes this outcome. There may be
other factors in the case that the above analysis does not
capture. 83 Nonetheless, together with results regarding
83. For instance, jurors might be more lenient to defendants who did not act
alone. We attempted to account for defendants with co-participants by including
the criminal docket number as an effect in a model that predicted the likelihood
of a given sentence outcome (i.e., death vs. other, life vs. other). This controlled
for any effects due to juries hearing about the same case but for different
defendants within our dataset. Even with this control, we still observed a
significant effect for the presence of a mitigating factor related to the outcome for
a co-participant. We recognize this analysis may not fully capture whether the
defendants acted alone. We do not have access to case files that would tell us
accurately whether the defendants in our data did or did not have co-participants.
We know only whether there are multiple verdict forms from the same case,
which is an imperfect measure of whether people acted alone or not. (For
example, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev acted in concert with his older brother to commit
the Boston Marathon bombing; but because his brother died without being tried,
we do not have this observation in the dataset.) Generally, however, given the
fact that the federal death sentencing statute permits co-participant sentences to
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write-ins, we view this type of mitigation as a salient and
significant signal to jurors about the morality of the ultimate
sentence.
3. Government Negligence
The verdict forms in the dataset reveal several ways in
which governmental agencies may have contributed to the
defendant becoming the kind of person who would commit
capital murder. Admission of evidence of government action
or inaction, such as ignoring the abuse of a defendant when
he was a child, would generally not be challenged, because it
involves the uncontroversial category of evidence pertaining
to the characteristics of the offender. We noticed that the
verdict form write-ins, however, direct attention to the
government, seemingly separately from how its conduct
illuminates the defendant’s character or the circumstances
of the offense. Jurors specifically blamed a government
entity in nineteen of the written-in mitigators—schools,
social agencies, courts, prisons—for failing the defendant in
some capacity. Indeed, they typically used some version of
the word “fail.” Here are some examples:
•

John Bass’s conduct was caused in part by an
inadequate social service system (i.e. Child Protective
Services) (9 votes) 84

•

[F]ailure of the State of Pennsylvania social and
mental health services to effectively intervene in his
childhood abuse and to treat or address his early
antisocial behavior (10 votes) 85

•

Several government sponsored support systems,
including education and probation, failed to
intervene in Billy’s downward spiraling path (5

be presented to the jury in mitigation, we would expect that, if there were a nondeath sentenced co-participant, the existence of that person would be reflected in
the verdict forms.
84. Special Findings Form at 55, United States v. Bass, No. 97-CR-80235
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 14, 2003) (emphasis added).
85. Special Verdict Form at 14, United States v. Fell, 372 F. Supp. 2d 786 (D.
Vt. 2005) (Crim. No. 2:01-CR-12-01) (emphasis added).
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votes) 86
•

The system failed Mr. Candelario-Santana after his
previous convictions in 2003 by: not applying
appropriate punishment; not adequately managing
his incarceration; applying rehabilitation programs
‘just to get it out of the way’; and not properly
following up to him during probation process. (6
votes) 87

•

The following Government agencies didn’t show
active envolement [sic] and any corrective action to
their inhuman conditions of the family. . . . (12
votes) 88

•

Inadequate action from the Department of Education
regarding [defendant’s] specialized needs. . . . (12
votes) 89

•

Defendant was failed by the court system when
psychological treatment was not forthcoming in
1997, when ordered by a judge (12 votes) 90

•

The Philadelphia School District failed to identify
[defendant] as a candidate for intervention at an
early age (12 votes) 91

•

Social services failed to follow up on Annette
Northington’s parental negligence (12 votes) 92

86. Special Verdict Form at 14, United States v. Allen, No. 4:97 CR 141 ERW
(E.D. Mo. Mar. 10, 1998) (emphasis added).
87. Special Verdict Form at 11, United States v. Candelario-Santana, 929 F.
Supp. 2d 24 (D.P.R. 2013) (No. 09-427 (JAF)) (emphasis added).
88. Special Verdict Form at 7, United States v. Jimenez-Bencevi, 934 F. Supp.
2d 360 (D.P.R. 2013) (Crim. No. 12-221(JAF)) (emphasis added).
89. Id.
90. Special Verdict Form for Murder of Jack Norris at 11, United States v.
Lyon, No. 4:99CR-11-M (W.D. Ky. Aug. 2, 2001) (emphasis added); Special
Verdict Form for Murder of James Nichols at 11, United States v. Lyon, No.
4:99CR-11-M (W.D. Ky. Aug. 2, 2001) (emphasis added).
91. Special Verdict Form for Penalty Phase at 14, United States v.
Northington, Crim. Action No. 07-550-05 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2013) (emphasis
added).
92. Id. (emphasis added).
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In addition to receiving substantial support, most of
these write-ins we coded as “new,” (i.e., the write-in did not
elaborate on an issue already on the form). 93 Again, the gist
of this evidence is well within the Lockett/Eddings
framework, but the moral thread is distinct. The evidence
tells the jury something important about how the defendant
became someone who would commit murder, but the jury
focused on the government’s fault.
We observed a separate form of government negligence
more proximate to the criminal event itself. We explore this
distinct dynamic of government blaming as mitigation
through the cases involving homicides in the Bureau of
Prisons (BOP). These cases frequently feature a range of
prison issues as mitigation, but we focus specifically on
government negligence that contributed to the defendant’s
ability to commit the offense, a type of evidence that courts
have sometimes excluded from the jury’s consideration. 94 To
assess jurors’ reactions to this form of government
negligence, we analyzed the twenty-three federal capital
prosecutions involving BOP homicides.
In eight cases, the verdict form asked the jury
specifically about BOP’s negligence in contributing to the
circumstances of the offense. For example, in United States
v. Garcia, the jury voted on the following items: 95

93. Seven of these nine write-ins were new. One jury rewrote an existing
mitigator to sharpen the focus on the government’s failure. Compare Special
Verdict Form for Murder of Jack Norris at 9, United States v. Lyon, No. 4:99CR11-M (W.D. Ky. Aug. 2, 2001) (“Billy Joe Lyon suffers from psychological
impairments which were identified and which could have been treated when he
was a child and adolescent.”), with Special Verdict Form for Murder of James
Nichols at 11, United States v. Lyon, No. 4:99CR-11-M (W.D. Ky. Aug. 2, 2001)
(“Billy Joe Lyon was failed by the court system when psychological treatment was
not forthcoming in 1997, when ordered by a judge.”).
94. See infra Section IV.C.1.
95. Special Verdict Form at 14, United States v. Garcia, No. 1:09-CR_15(2)
(E.D. Tex. 2010).
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Across the BOP cases, jurors considered whether a
specific BOP failure mitigated the offense thirty-eight
times. 96 We saw no evidence that jurors reject these ideas
outright. In fact, the opposite was true. Nearly two-thirds
(63%) of specific prison negligence mitigators received at
least one vote.
In all cases, jurors’ reactions resembled what we
described for co-participant sentences: they considered these
factors just as mitigating as factors that fall under the
Lockett/Eddings paradigm. Looking at cases in which jurors
considered mitigators involving BOP failure alongside
Lockett/Eddings mitigators, mitigators about BOP
responsibility had vote totals that were consistent with other
mitigators on the form (2.92 votes vs. 2.46 votes, respectively,
not a statistically significant difference, p < .47). 97
96. We separately coded mitigators regarding general BOP negligence, such
as an overall failure to maintain a safe environment, from those involving specific
failures that facilitated the offense.
97. Again, we removed the contested categories—here, EIE and coparticipant sentences—to underscore how jurors are looking beyond the initial
Lockett/Eddings categories.
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In any individual case, however, jurors could be more
receptive to mitigation related to government failure than to
Lockett/Eddings evidence of personal moral culpability.
Only 8% of mitigators relevant to Edgar Garcia’s personal
background garnered any juror votes at all; forty-nine out of
fifty-three mitigators had zero votes. 98 By contrast, the five
mitigators that cited specific government failures averaged
5.6 votes, with the lowest attracting two votes, and the
highest attracting ten votes. 99 While the jurors may not have
found his background mitigating, we see in Garcia’s case how
the government’s conduct emerged as a conceptually
different kind of mitigation. 100 We saw this in the juror writeins as well, as shown in Table 5.

98. Forty-nine of his Lockett/Eddings mitigators won zero votes; four of his
mitigators have one, three, four, and eight, respectively. See Special Verdict Form
at 11, United States v. Garcia, No. 1:09-CR_15(2) (E.D. Tex. 2010).
99. See id. at 10–11. In addition to those presented in the text, two jurors
voted for the mitigator, “The offense would not have occurred if the BOP
Beaumont facility had followed proper policies.” See id. at 11.
100. We note that Garcia’s jury was specifically asked to decide whether a
particular factor existed and was mitigating. See id. at 2–11.
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BOP Negligence Write-Ins
Write-In
(# votes)

Related to other mitigators
on form? (# votes)

“The BOP didn’t do
their job by faulty
logic of putting
William and Rudy in
the same cell.” (8)

“Upon William Sablan’s arrival at
the United States PenitentiaryFlorence, the Bureau of Prisons
(‘BOP’) placed him in cell 124 of the
Special Housing Unit along with
Rudy Sablan and Joey Estrella,
despite the fact that the cell was
designed to house only two people.”
(1) 101

Rudy
Sablan

“Joey died because the
guards failed to do 30
minute rounds.” (7)

New. The closest mitigator was:
“The circumstances that led to Joey
Estrella’s death existed, at least in
part, because of failure(s) by BOP
officials to properly do their job(s),
by allowing alcohol and weapons in
the cell.” (2) 102

Ulysses
Jones

“BOP lack of
consideration for his
previous crimes for
housing placements.”
(6)

New. Not associated with other
factors on the form. 103

Rudy
Sablan

Compared to what was presented to them, these writeins use stronger language about the BOP than the jury form
offered. Rudy Sablan’s jury said directly, “BOP didn’t do their
job,” eschewing the more anodyne and bureaucratic language
offered in the verdict form mitigator. Jurors also added
additional failures (i.e., officers’ failure to make rounds) to

101. Special Findings Form at 6, 9, United States v. Sablan, No. 00-CR-00531WYD (D. Colo. May 20, 2008).
102. Id.
103. See Special Verdict Form for Count One (Murder in the First Degree in
the Death of Timothy Baker) and Count Two (Murder by a Federal Prisoner in
the Death of Timothy Baker) at 10–16, United States v. Jones, No. 10-03090-01CR-S-DGK (W.D. Mo. Oct. 16, 2017).
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the verdict form mitigator. 104 For Ulysses Jones (who killed
his cellmate), the jury raised BOP’s housing placement on its
own. 105 A strong majority of write-ins about governmental
failures (74%) were coded as new, further indicating that this
was a distinct way that juries considered mitigation. 106
In the next Part, we discuss why the Constitution
requires us to care about these findings.
II. JURIES, DEATH SENTENCING, AND THE VOICE OF THE
NORMATIVE COMMUNITY
The jury has long been recognized as integral to the
American democratic project. In Democracy in America,
Tocqueville wrote, “The institution of the jury places the real
direction of society in the hands of the governed, and not in
that of the government. [It] invests the people, or that class
of citizens, with the direction of society.” 107 Justice Scalia
was more specific: “Just as suffrage ensures the people’s
ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches,
jury trial is meant to ensure their control of the judiciary.” 108
In criminal trials, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III of the

104. See Special Findings Form at 6, 9, United States v. Sablan, No. 00-CR00531-WYD (D. Colo. May 20, 2008).
105. Special Verdict Form for Count One (Murder in the First Degree in the
Death of Timothy Baker) and Count Two (Murder by a Federal Prisoner in the
Death of Timothy Baker) at 10–16, United States v. Jones, No. 10-03090-01-CRS-DGK (W.D. Mo. Oct. 16, 2017).
106. Unlike with EIE and co-participant evidence, we did not see a significant
relationship between government negligence in BOP cases and sentence
outcomes. Further, this sample, at twenty-three cases, is too small to generate
valid statistics.
107. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 293–94 (Philip Bradley
ed., Vintage Books 1945) (1835), quoted in J. Harvie Wilkinson III, In Defense of
American Criminal Justice, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1099, 1157 (2014).
108. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004); see also United States v.
Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2375 (2019) (“Just as the right to vote sought to
preserve the people’s authority over their government’s executive and legislative
functions, the right to a jury trial sought to preserve the people’s authority over
its judicial functions.”).
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United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit notes
jury verdicts “legitimize the criminal justice system,”
because they “anchor[] convictions and punishment in the
defendant’s community.” 109 The juries’ normative beliefs
connect to a dominant philosophy of punishment:
retribution. “In respect to retribution, jurors possess an
important comparative advantage over judges. In principle,
they are more attuned to the community’s moral sensibility
. . . because they reflect more accurately the composition and
experiences of the community as a whole.” 110
This community representation is particularly
important in death penalty cases, and jurors’ special role
courses through the Court’s death penalty decisions. In
Witherspoon v. Illinois, the Court characterized “one of the
most important functions any jury can perform” in choosing
“between life imprisonment and capital punishment” is “to
maintain a link between contemporary community values
and the penal system.” 111 They are “best able to express the
conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life
or death.” 112 In Woodson v. North Carolina, the Court quoted
Witherspoon on the way to striking down a statute that, by
requiring the death penalty for certain murders, bypassed
the crucial exercise of the jury’s discretion. 113
The bifurcated structure of the capital trial reinforces
the normative decision jurors make at sentencing. During
the guilt/innocence phase, the jury decides facts. It must
decide if a crime was committed by assessing, e.g., the
109. Wilkinson, supra note 107, at 1160.
110. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(citations and internal punctuation omitted).
111. 391 U.S. 510, 519 & n.15 (1968).
112. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 470 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (citation and internal quotations omitted), overruled
by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016) (holding that juries, not judges,
must make sentencing decisions).
113. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 295 (1976) (quoting
Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519 & n.15).
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credibility of an alibi witness and the severity of that crime
by evaluating the defendant’s intent at the time he 114
committed the homicide. During the sentencing phase, the
jury hears evidence about whether to sentence the defendant
to death. This bifurcation serves two purposes. It solves an
evidentiary problem; some of the defendant’s best evidence
for sparing him from the death penalty may also help prove
his guilt. 115 But it also signals the jury’s qualitatively
different inquiry when it decides on the sentence to impose
on the defendant: what is a just punishment in this case? 116
Not only does the jury ensure the retributive justification
for the death penalty, 117 but it also functions as a kind of
procedural protection against excessive punishment and
reflects evolving standards of decency. Its “severity and
irrevocability” make the death penalty “qualitatively
different from any other punishment,” requiring “unique
114. Of 2,508 death row prisoners on April 1, 2021, 51 are women. For
simplicity, we use the masculine pronouns. See Death Row Overview, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row/overview (last visited
Dec. 21, 2021); see also Women, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row/women (last visited Dec. 21, 2021).
115. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“Much
of the information that is relevant to the sentencing decision may have no
relevance to the question of guilt, or may even be extremely prejudicial to a fair
determination of that question.”). Evidence of poor impulse control caused by
brain injury, for example, may make the defendant seem more likely to have
committed the murder, while also mitigating his moral culpability.
116. See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 261 (1988) (Marshall, J.,
concurring). (“Unlike the determination of guilt or innocence, which turns largely
on an evaluation of objective facts, the question whether death is the appropriate
sentence requires a profoundly moral evaluation of the defendant’s character and
crime.”); cf. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 180 (2006) (Weighing aggravators
and mitigators is a “measured, normative process in which a jury is
constitutionally tasked to engage when deciding the appropriate sentence for a
capital defendant.”); United States v. Gabrion, 719 F.3d 511, 533 (6th Cir. 2013)
(In federal capital sentencing, “the judgment is moral—for the root of ‘justify’ is
‘just.’”); United States v. Runyon, 707 F.3d 475, 516 (4th Cir. 2013) (Weighing
aggravating and mitigating factors is “a complex moral judgment.”); United
States v. Hager, 721 F.3d 167, 207 (4th Cir. 2013) (same).
117. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (1976) (plurality opinion) (Death penalty’s two
principal social purposes are retribution and deterrence, and “capital punishment
is an expression of society’s moral outrage.”).
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safeguards to ensure that it is a justified response to a given
offense.” 118 The jury is one of those safeguards. Justice
Stevens explained, “I am convinced that the danger of an
excessive response can only be avoided if the decision to
impose the death penalty is made by a jury rather than by a
single governmental official.” 119
In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court identified the jury’s
normative importance as a matter of Eighth Amendment
law: “Jury sentencing has been considered desirable in
capital cases in order to maintain a link between
contemporary community values and the penal system—a
link without which the determination of punishment could
hardly reflect the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.” 120
We elaborate below how the Court has translated this
broader idea of the jury’s normative role into its specific task
as capital sentencers. One thing is clear, however: “[C]apital
punishment rests on not a legal but an ethical judgment.” 121
As Joshua Kleinfeld has observed:
[U]nlike most juries, the capital jury cannot even by the thinnest of
fictions be said to confront a purely factual question. The question
it confronts is a moral one: once a defendant’s guilt is settled and
aggravators and mitigators found, the jury’s final task is to decide
what sentence is just. Thus capital juries are an agent of ordinary
118. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), overruled by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619
(2016) (holding that juries, not judges, must make sentencing decisions).
119. Id. at 469.
120. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also id. at 173 (The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment “draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.” (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 100–01 (1958))); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) (Eighth
Amendment draws its meaning from “basic mores of society” because “standard
of extreme cruelty . . . necessarily embodies a moral judgment.”).
121. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 481 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see also Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 352 n.7 (1985) (describing
sentencing decision as “highly subjective and “largely a moral judgment of the
defendant’s desert”).
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moral thought in criminal law. 122

Not only is the punishment decision a moral one, but the
moral significance of particular mitigating evidence is also a
“value call.” 123 We discuss the Court’s treatment of specific
types of mitigating evidence in the next Part.
III. INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCING AND THE
EVOLVING DEFINITION OF “MITIGATION”
In Woodson v. North Carolina 124 and then in Lockett v.
Ohio, 125
the
Supreme
Court
established
the
individualization of the defendant as a bedrock principle of
capital sentencing. In Woodson, the Supreme Court rejected
North Carolina’s mandatory death penalty for all capital
offenses. 126 Because of the qualitative difference between life
and death sentences—as the Court observed, “[d]eath, in its
finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year
prison term differs from one of only a year or two” 127—and
consequently heightened need for reliability, capital
sentencing proceedings must allow the jury to understand
the defendant as an individual. 128 In condemning North
Carolina’s mandatory death sentencing, the Court explained
that the sentencer had to have the opportunity to consider
“relevant facets of the character and record of the individual
offender or the circumstances of the particular offense,”
because it had to be able to reflect on
the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming
from the diverse frailties of humankind. [A mandatory death
sentence] treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not as

122. Kleinfeld, supra note 23, at 1137.
123. Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633, 642 (2016).
124. 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion).
125. 438 U.S. 586, 602–05 (1978) (plurality opinion).
126. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (plurality opinion).
127. Id.
128. See id.
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uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless,
undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the
penalty of death. 129

Such nuanced decision-making was not simply
consistent with traditional sentencing practice, it was
constitutionally compelled: “[T]he fundamental respect for
humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires
consideration of the character and record of the individual
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting
the penalty of death.” 130
A plurality of the Court reaffirmed the centrality of the
individualization requirement in Lockett v. Ohio. 131 While
North Carolina excluded mitigating evidence at sentencing,
Ohio limited the kind of evidence the trial court could
consider. In Ohio, the sentencing judge was required to
impose the death penalty unless the judge found the
defendant had proven one of three legal excuses or
defenses. 132 The judge could consider only whether “(1) the
victim had induced or facilitated the offense, (2) it was
unlikely that Lockett would have committed the offense but
for the fact that she was under duress, coercion, or strong
provocation, or (3) the offense was primarily the product of
Lockett’s psychosis or mental deficiency.” 133
Lockett argued that the Ohio statute unconstitutionally
prohibited the judge from considering information she
considered mitigating, namely, “her character, prior record,
age, lack of specific intent to cause death, and her relatively
minor part in the crime.” 134 The Supreme Court struck down

129. Id. at 304.
130. Id.
131. 438 U.S. at 605 (plurality opinion).
132. Id. at 593–94 (majority opinion).
133. Id. (internal punctuation omitted).
134. Id. at 597 (plurality opinion).
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the Ohio statute, concluding that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the
sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that
the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. 135

Lockett’s plurality opinion became the majority rule in
Eddings v. Oklahoma, when the Court held the Eighth
Amendment’s individualization requirement compelled trial
courts to admit evidence of the defendant’s “unhappy
upbringing and emotional disturbance” at sentencing. 136
The Court went on to refine the sentencer’s role to
distinguish
the
punishment
decision
from
the
guilt/innocence decision. While the latter finds legal
culpability, the former reflects the defendant’s “personal
culpability.” 137 This personal culpability requires “an
individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the
death penalty.” 138 For example, “defendants who commit
criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged
background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be
[viewed as] less culpable than defendants who have no such
excuse.” 139 Only if the sentencer has the opportunity to
consider and give effect to this kind of evidence can the
sentencer make “a reliable determination that death is the
appropriate sentence” and impose a sentence that “reflect[s]
a reasoned moral response to the defendant’s background,
character, and crime.” 140

135. Id. at 604.
136. 455 U.S. 104, 109, 112, 117 (1982).
137. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 323 (1989), abrogated on other
grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and holding modified by
Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990), and Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990).
138. Id. at 319.
139. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
140. Penry, 492 U.S. at 319 (quoting first Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 304, 305 (1976); then Brown, 479 U.S. at 545).
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A. Expanding Mitigation Beyond Evidence of Defendant’s
Moral Culpability for the Crime
In Skipper v. South Carolina, the Supreme Court
confronted another limit on mitigating evidence. 141 South
Carolina prevented defendant Skipper from introducing
testimony that he had “made a good adjustment” to jail
during his pretrial incarceration. 142 As far as South Carolina
was concerned, Skipper’s conduct in jail (and any inference
about his future conduct in prison) was irrelevant: “[A]ny
such inferences would not relate specifically to petitioner’s
culpability for the crime he committed.” 143
The Supreme Court reversed. It first cited Eddings and
then continued: “Equally clear is the corollary rule that the
sentencer may not refuse to consider or be precluded from
considering any relevant mitigating evidence.” 144 The Court
concluded, “there is no question but that such inferences
[about Skipper’s ability to adjust peacefully to prison life]
would be ‘mitigating’ in the sense that they might serve ‘as a
basis for a sentence less than death.’” 145 While not relevant
to why he committed the homicide, Skipper’s ability to adjust
to prison was important information to a jury considering his
future dangerousness. 146 As such, it “must be considered
potentially mitigating,” and must be admitted. 147
The Supreme Court thereby redirected the inquiry from
Skipper’s personal culpability for the crime to a different
question—the fundamental one: what sentence should be
imposed on Skipper? The Supreme Court extended Eddings’s
narrow focus on the defendant in relation to the offense to a
141. 476 U.S. 1, 3 (1986).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 4.
144. Id. (internal punctuation and citation omitted).
145. Id. at 4–5 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)).
146. Id. at 8.
147. Id. at 5.
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more comprehensive view of what a sentencer might consider
relevant to sentencing.
That the Court was extending Lockett and Eddings is
made plain from the concurrence’s complaint:
The Court unnecessarily abandons [a] narrow [alternative]
ground of decision for a broader one, holding that the proffered
testimony was mitigating evidence that must be admitted under the
Eighth Amendment. . . .
. . . Such evidence has no bearing at all on the “circumstances of
the offense,” since it concerns the defendant’s behavior after the
crime has been committed. Nor does it say anything necessarily
relevant about a defendant’s “character or record,” as that phrase
was used in Lockett and Eddings.
Those decisions clearly focus on evidence that lessens the
defendant’s culpability for the crime for which he was convicted. . . .
In this case, for the first time, the Court classifies as “mitigating”
conduct that occurred after the crime and after the accused has been
charged. Almost by definition, such conduct neither excuses the
defendant’s crime nor reduces his responsibility for its commission.
It cannot, therefore, properly be considered “mitigating evidence”
that the sentencer must consider under the Constitution. 148

Over the next few years, the Court made clear it was
charting a new direction, reiterating that jurors should be
able to consider “evidence if the sentencer could reasonably
find that it warrants a sentence less than death.” 149 In Payne
v. Tennessee, in which the Court found that evidence of the
impact of the murder on the survivors was not
constitutionally barred, the Court pointed to the wide range
of evidence defendants can introduce in mitigation. It
observed, “[s]tates cannot limit the sentencer’s consideration
of any relevant circumstance that could cause it to decline to
impose the [death] penalty.” 150
148. Id. at 11–12 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman,
550 U.S. 233, 248 (2007) (“While Chief Justice Burger’s opinion in Lockett was
joined by only three other Justices, the rule it announced was endorsed and
broadened in our subsequent decisions in Eddings and Skipper.” (internal
citations omitted)).
149. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 441 (1990).
150. 501 U.S. 808, 824 (1991).
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B. The Crooked Line from Skipper to Tennard
Skipper’s more holistic understanding of mitigation
offered the Court a pathway to resolve years of tortured
litigation over the Texas death penalty statute. 151 While
ostensibly addressing the question of whether this statute
enabled Texas juries to take certain mitigating evidence into
account in reaching its sentencing decision, this Texasspecific litigation simultaneously reaffirmed the Court’s
expanding vision of mitigation.
The death penalty statute Texas enacted after Furman
asked jurors to answer certain questions (so-called “special
issues”) whose answers would trigger either a death or life
sentence. 152 The defendant would be sentenced to death if
the State persuaded the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant’s conduct was “deliberate[],” that it was
probable “that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence” constituting “a continuing threat to society,” and, if
raised by the evidence, that the defendant’s conduct “was an
unreasonable response to the provocation, if any, by the
deceased.” 153 Texas death-sentenced prisoners argued for
decades that the statute prevented defendants from
presenting—and jurors from considering and giving effect

151. Jordan M. Steiker, Penry v. Lynaugh: The Hazards of Predicting the
Future, in JOHN H. BLUME, JORDAN M. STEIKER, DEATH PENALTY STORIES 277,
297–310 (2009).
152. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268–69 (1976). The sentencing statute, Tex.
Pen. Code. §19.03 (1947) changed in 1991. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
37.071 (West 2019). Prosecutions of offenses committed prior to September 1,
1991, are governed by article 37.0711. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.0711
(West 2019). Until 2005, life sentences for capital murder in Texas included the
possibility of parole. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(a) (West 2019) (current
statute).
153. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 268–69; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b)
(West 2007). The constitutionality of this statute was upheld in Jurek, 428 U.S.
at 268–69, a companion case to Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See also
David McCord, What’s Messing with Texas Death Sentences?, 43 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 601, 605 (2011); Scott Phillips, Legal Disparities in the Capital of Capital
Punishment, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 717, 755 n.55 (2009).
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to—mitigation evidence routinely admitted elsewhere. 154
In Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court agreed that the questions
posed to the jury did not enable the jurors to “consider and
give effect” to evidence of the defendant’s intellectual
disability as mitigation. 155 As a result, the jury was denied
“a vehicle for expressing its reasoned moral response to that
evidence in rendering its sentencing decision.” 156 After
Penry, however, the Supreme Court deflected challenges to
the Texas statute. The jury in Boyde v. California was
instructed to consider in sentencing “[a]ny other
circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even
though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.” 157 The
defendant argued this prohibited the jury from considering
mitigating evidence about his background and character. 158
The Court noted that while the Eighth Amendment entitles
the defendant to have the sentencer hear his mitigating
evidence, States remain “free to structure and shape
consideration” of that evidence so long as they do not prevent
consideration altogether. 159 The Court found there was “no
reasonable likelihood” that the jury interpreted the
instruction to keep it from considering this evidence. 160 It

154. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 310–11 (1989), abrogated on
other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and holding modified
by Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990), and Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484
(1990); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 465 (1993); Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S.
350, 366 (1993); Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 276 (2004); Abdul-Kabir v.
Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 237 (2007); Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286, 288
(2007); Smith v. Texas, 550 U.S. 297, 311 (2007). Margulies, Blume, and Johnson
document the cases of 90 Texas prisoners who were executed after courts rejected
their Penry claims prior to Tennard. Joseph Margulies, John H. Blume & Sheri
Lynn Johnson, Dead Right: A Capital Punishment Cautionary Tale, 53 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 60, 73–78, 122–126 (2021).
155. Penry, 492 U.S. at 328.
156. Id.
157. Boyde, 494 U.S. at 373–74.
158. See id. at 378, 382 n.5.
159. Id. at 377.
160. Id. at 381.
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would subsequently use Boyde to limit Penry to defendants
with intellectual disability. 161
Over a decade later, the Supreme Court substantially
resolved the dispute over Texas’s special issues in Tennard
v. Dretke, 162 while also clarifying what constitutes mitigating
evidence. Robert Tennard complained that the Texas death
sentencing statute did not give the jury the opportunity to
consider and give effect to evidence of his low intellectual
functioning. 163 The only information the jury had been
provided was his IQ score of sixty-seven. 164 The Fifth Circuit
had rejected his claim, ruling that the IQ evidence was not
“constitutionally relevant,” based on its own gloss on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Penry v. Lynaugh. 165 The Fifth
Circuit interpreted Penry to require Tennard to demonstrate
his low IQ was “constitutionally relevant” mitigating
evidence, i.e., “evidence of a uniquely severe permanent
handicap with which the defendant was burdened through
no fault of his own” and to which “the criminal act was
attributable.” 166
The last condition has been described as a “nexus
requirement,” 167 as it requires a relationship between the
proffered mitigating evidence and the offense. Since
Tennard’s trial counsel never established how Tennard’s low
IQ related to his commission of the offense, it failed the nexus

161. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367–69 (1992) (“The standard against
which we assess whether jury instructions satisfy the rule of Lockett and Eddings
was set forth in Boyde. . . . We decide that there is no reasonable likelihood that
the jury would have found itself foreclosed from considering the relevant aspects
of petitioner’s youth.”); see also Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 491–92, 497 n.10
(1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
162. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 288 (2004).
163. Id. at 277.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 283–84.
166. Id. at 281 (quoting Tennard v. Cockrell, 284 F.3d 591, 595 (5th Cir. 2002),
vacated, 537 U.S. 802 (2002)).
167. See, e.g., Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 45 (2004).
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test. 168 The Fifth Circuit therefore concluded that it did not
matter that the jury could not give effect to this mitigation
in answering the sentencing questions. 169
The Supreme Court squarely rejected the Fifth Circuit’s
reasoning: “The Fifth Circuit’s test has no foundation in the
decisions of this Court.” 170 It reminded the Fifth Circuit that,
in its prior opinions discussing the relevance standard for
mitigating evidence, it “spoke in the most expansive
terms.” 171 “[A] State cannot bar the consideration of . . .
evidence if the sentencer could reasonably find that it
warrants a sentence less than death.” 172 The Court quoted
Payne: “We have held that a State cannot preclude the
sentencer from considering ‘any relevant mitigating
evidence’ that the defendant proffers in support of a sentence
less than death,” and that “virtually no limits are placed on
the relevant mitigating evidence a capital defendant may
introduce concerning his own circumstances.” 173
It also repeatedly returned to Skipper. 174 In rejecting the
Fifth Circuit’s complex test for “constitutional relevance,” the
Court reaffirmed Skipper’s central holding, its “corollary
rule” to Eddings and Lockett: “[T]he question is simply
whether the evidence is of such a character that it ‘might

168. Tennard, 284 F.3d at 597.
169. Id. at 596–97 (“Even assuming arguendo for purposes of this appeal that
Tennard has rebutted with clear and convincing evidence the state court’s finding
of no evidence of [intellectual disability], his claim must fail because he made no
showing at trial that the criminal act was attributable to this severe permanent
condition. . . . A petitioner must show there is a nexus between the severe
permanent condition (here, alleged [intellectual disability]) and the capital
murder.” (emphasis omitted)).
170. Tennard, 542 U.S. at 284.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 285 (quoting McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 441 (1990)).
173. Id. (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822 (1991) (citation
omitted)).
174. Id. at 285–88.
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serve as a basis for a sentence less than death.’” 175
A few years later, the Court observed in Abdul-Kabir v.
Quarterman that
[a] careful review of our jurisprudence in this area makes clear that
. . . sentencing juries must be able to give meaningful consideration
and effect to all mitigating evidence that might provide a basis for
refusing to impose the death penalty on a particular individual,
notwithstanding the severity of his crime or his potential to commit
similar offenses in the future. 176

In a companion case, the Court underscored the extent
to which the contemporary definition of mitigating evidence
has evolved from Lockett and Eddings: “[W]e have long
recognized that a sentencing jury must be able to give a
‘reasoned moral response’ to a defendant’s mitigating
evidence—particularly that evidence which tends to
diminish his culpability—when deciding whether to sentence
him to death.” 177 The “particularly” signals that, while the
Court has generally focused on evidence that diminishes the
defendant’s culpability, it is not limited to that.
In sum, Lockett and Eddings pointed to characteristics of
the defendant or circumstances of the crime in the narrowest
sense: How substantial was the defendant’s role in the
crime? How serious was his criminal history? Did he, as the
Court in Eddings put it, “suffer[] from severe psychological
and emotional disorders, [such] that the killing was in
actuality an inevitable product of the way he was raised”? 178
Skipper loosened the link between evidence that bears on the
moral culpability of the defendant for the crime and
mitigating evidence, shifting focus from the crime to the
175. Id. at 287 (quoting Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986)).
176. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 246 (2007).
177. Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286, 289 (2007) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 323 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002), and holding modified by Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990),
and Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990).
178. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 109 (1982) (quoting Eddings v. State,
616 P.2d 1159, 1170 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980)).
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punishment. Whether the defendant could live peaceably in
prison in the future was relevant information to the jury in
deciding on the sentence. Then Tennard’s broad language
affirmed the importance of enabling the jury to make a
holistic moral assessment of the punishment appropriate for
this particular individual.
Emad Atiq and Erin Miller argue that, given this shift,
“individualized moral consideration of mitigating factors
requires that the sentencer’s reasoning not be cabined by
artificial legal constraints.” 179 What unites Lockett, Eddings,
Tennard, and Smith is the Court’s effort to “elicit[] moral
consideration . . . by removing legal constraints on [the
sentencer’s] ability to consider the evidence from a purely
moral point of view. 180 It is therefore “unconstitutional for
sentencers to limit the moral principles under which they
consider mitigating evidence for legalistic reasons.” 181 Not
only do we believe this is correct as a matter of law, but also
that it is inevitable in reflecting on the dynamics of capital
jury decision-making. 182 What we see in the Court’s
progression from Lockett to Tennard is the Court’s efforts to
articulate a legal standard that acknowledges the jury’s
peculiarly normative, and fundamentally non-legal, task.

179. Atiq & Miller, supra note 25, at 189 (emphasis omitted).
180. Id. at 191.
181. Id. at 189.
182. See Costanzo & Costanzo, supra note 19, at 190, 197.
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C. Challenges to this Understanding of the Court’s
Jurisprudence
Despite the Court’s description of its jurisprudence as
“clear,” 183 the road to Tennard suggests that this definition
of mitigation was not inevitable, consistently advanced by
the Court, nor uniformly accepted. A post-Tennard brief filed
by the government in a federal death penalty case, for
example, quoted from a number of cases in which the
Supreme Court used some variant of the “characteristics of
the offender or circumstances of the crime” locution to
describe mitigation. 184 The same brief also rejects our
reading of Skipper, highlighting language in the opinion that
describes evidence of Skipper’s adjustment to jail as helping
the jury “consider[] all relevant facets of the character and
record of the individual offender.” 185 Under this view, the
Court may have loosened the connection to the crime, but not
from the focus on the defendant.
The en banc Sixth Circuit also expressed skepticism that
Tennard represented a shift in the Court’s definition of
mitigating evidence, finding that, while the Court did write

183. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 246 (2007).
184. Brief for the United States in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari at 20,
Garcia v. United States, 571 U.S. 1195 (2014) (No. 12-10821) (filed Jan. 6, 2014
in opposition to Petition for Certiorari) (“The Court’s decisions following
Woodson, Lockett, and Eddings have repeatedly relied on the Lockett plurality’s
definition of constitutionally required mitigating evidence, and the Court has
never indicated that the required evidence extends beyond that definition’s two
broad categories.” (first citing McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 443 (1990);
then Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989); then Mills v. Maryland, 486
U.S. 367, 374 (1988); and then Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986))).
185. Id. at 8–9 (emphasis added). The government also noted other cases in
which the Supreme Court limited evidence that might fit into this more holistic
approach. Id. at 21. For example, in Oregon v. Guzek, the Supreme Court held
the capital defendant was not entitled to introduce at sentencing new “innocencerelated evidence,” where he could have presented it during the guilt/innocence
phase of the trial, as it “sheds no light on the manner in which he committed the
crime for which he has been convicted.” 546 U.S. 517, 519, 523, 526–27 (2006).
Because we focus solely on evidence relevant to the moral decision of sentencing
a guilty person, Guzek is not relevant to our argument.
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that mitigation was anything “the sentencer could
reasonably find . . . warrants a sentence less than death,” one
had to “read [the phrase] in the context of the rest of the
Supreme Court’s mitigation-evidence caselaw.” 186 This led
the Sixth Circuit to conclude that “that passage simply refers
to evidence relevant to a reasoned moral response to the
defendant’s background, character, and crime.” 187 Agreeing
that the sentencing decision was a moral decision, the Sixth
Circuit found that the Supreme Court had designated only
two “morally significant bins”—“broadly stated, culpability
and character”—into which evidence must fall to be
admissible. 188 To interpret the decision otherwise would be
to understand the Eighth Amendment to “compel admission
of evidence regarding the positions of the planets and moons
at the time of the defendant’s offense—so long as he can show
that at least one juror is a firm believer in astrology.” 189
As we have argued, the Court’s evolving definition of
mitigating evidence is better understood to extend beyond
“culpability and character” to the full complexity of moral
decision-making, a task wholly other than astrology. In the
following Part, we explain why some courts have excluded
execution impact evidence, a co-participant’s non-death
sentence, and evidence of government negligence, and then
discuss the moral, not idiosyncratic, relevance of this
evidence.

186. United States v. Gabrion, 719 F.3d 511, 522 (2013) (quoting Tennard v.
Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 285 (2004)).
187. Id. (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989), abrogated on
other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and holding modified
by Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990), and Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484
(1990).
188. Id. at 523.
189. Id. at 522.
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IV. CONTESTED MITIGATION AND MORAL DECISION-MAKING
As we mentioned above, we focused on capital juries’
assessments of evidence of execution impact, co-participant
sentencing, and government negligence, because these
categories of evidence are legally contested, but also because
they are relevant to frameworks of moral decision-making.
In this Part, we describe both the legal debate and relevant
moral perspectives.
A. Exclusion of Execution Impact Evidence
1. Legal Debate
As discussed above in Section I.C.1, “execution impact”
evidence (EIE) generally consists of witnesses (usually
family members) who testify to the harm they would suffer if
the defendant were executed. Some courts have permitted
EIE to the extent that it demonstrates the defendant’s good
character, that he is someone who can be loved. By contrast,
testimony about how someone would suffer as a result of the
defendant’s execution is more contested.
The California Supreme Court explained in approving
the admission of execution impact evidence: “A defendant
may offer evidence that he or she is loved by family members
or others, and that these individuals want him or her to live.
[This] evidence is relevant because it constitutes indirect
evidence of the defendant’s character.” 190 The court
contrasted this relevance with the defendant’s family’s
experience: “[S]ympathy for a defendant’s family is not a
matter that a capital jury can consider in mitigation.” 191
190. People v. Ochoa, 966 P.2d 442, 505–06 (Cal. 1998).
191. Id. at 506; see also People v. Gonzales, 281 P.3d 834, 880 (Cal. 2012) (“We
distinguish[] between ‘evidence that [a defendant] is loved by family members or
others, and that these individuals want him or her to live . . . [and evidence about]
whether the defendant’s family deserves to suffer the pain of having a family
member executed.’ . . . [T]he latter improperly asks the jury to spare the
defendant’s life because it ‘believes that the impact of the execution would be
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One trial court limited witness testimony accordingly:
As Defense counsel stated at oral argument, [the witness] may
testify to the effect “that he has been a good enough person to build
a relationship with someone to the point that that person will say I
care that he’s going to be executed and I don’t want to see him
executed.” 192

The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have notably held that the
defendant has no right to present execution impact
evidence. 193 The Fourth Circuit, citing Lockett, rejected
execution impact evidence in United States v. Hager because
“to allow evidence about the impact the execution will have
upon a third party goes beyond testimony about the
defendant’s character, prior record, or the circumstances of
devastating to other members of the defendant’s family.’” (quoting Ochoa, 966
P.2d at 505–06)); State v. Dickerson, 716 S.E.2d 895, 906–07 (S.C. 2011) (holding
EIE admissible only insofar as it illuminates defendant’s character).
192. United States v. Williams, 18 F. Supp. 3d 1065, 1071–72 (D. Haw. 2014)
(citation omitted).
193. Many states have also rejected execution impact evidence. See, e.g.,
Albarran v. State, 96 So. 3d 131, 204–06 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (holding
execution impact testimony should not be considered as a mitigating
circumstance); Woods v. State, 13 So. 3d 1, 33–34 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) (holding
execution impact evidence is not a valid mitigating circumstance and is irrelevant
in the penalty-phase of a capital-murder trial “because it does not relate to a
defendant’s character or record or the circumstances of the crime”); State v.
Chappell, 236 P.3d 1176, 1185 (Ariz. 2010) (Eighth Amendment does not limit
“the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing
on the defendant’s character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense.”
(quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 n.12 (1978))); State v. Anderson, 996
So. 2d 973, 1014 (La. 2008) (holding no right of defense to elicit impact testimony);
State v. Nicholson, 558 S.E.2d 109, 136 (N.C. 2002) (EIE properly excluded,
because evidence does not “bear[] on the defendant’s character, prior record, or
the circumstances of his offense.”); Commonwealth v. Harris, 817 A.2d 1033, 1054
(Pa. 2002) (same); State v. Dickerson, 716 S.E.2d 895, 906–07 (S.C. 2011) (holding
defendant’s cousin’s testimony about effect defendant’s execution would have on
family properly excluded as bordering on opinion as to proper sentence); Jackson
v. State, 33 S.W.3d 828, 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (upholding exclusion of
execution impact testimony); Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 778–79 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007) (EIE is not admissible, “because it does not pertain to appellant’s
background, character, or record, or the circumstances of the offense.”); see also
Wayne A. Logan, When Balance and Fairness Collide: An Argument for Execution
Impact Evidence in Capital Trials, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 32–33 (2000)
(noting that admission of such evidence is a minority position).
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the crime.” 194 Execution impact evidence is “improper,”
because it “in no way reflects on the defendant’s
culpability.” 195
Quoting from Coleman v. Saffle, 196 a pre-Tennard case,
the Fourth Circuit explained why execution impact evidence
is not mitigating evidence:
The only way they could be considered to bear on [the defendant’s]
character is to assume that a wife or sister-in-law would not love
him unless he had some good character traits. We doubt that a
mother’s love is given only to those children who deserve it; we
doubt that a wife (or even a sister-in-law) expresses love only for a
husband who deserves it. And even if the statement of love implies
some good character traits, it does not identify what they are. Thus,
we hold that the statements here do not constitute “relevant
mitigating evidence” on which a jury could base sympathy. 197

The Fifth Circuit in Jackson v. Dretke similarly used preTennard law as its touchstone, concluding that execution
impact evidence “is not relevant either to the degree of harm
Jackson’s crime caused or to Jackson’s moral culpability for
the crime.” 198 In dissent, Judge Dennis reviewed the
development of mitigation law since Lockett, citing McKoy,
Payne, and Skipper, and argued:
Execution impact testimony easily satisfies this sentencing
relevance test—it is testimony as to the value of the defendant’s life
and cost of his death to family and friends, and this value or cost
could serve as a basis for the sentencer to determine that the death
penalty should not be imposed. 199

194. United States v. Hager, 721 F.3d 167, 194–95 (4th Cir. 2013).
195. Id.; see also State v. Stenson, 940 P.2d 1239, 1281 (Wash. 1997); People v.
Sanders, 905 P.2d 420, 459 (Cal. 1995).
196. Coleman v. Saffle, 869 F.2d 1377, 1393 (10th Cir. 1989).
197. Hager, 721 F.3d at 195; see also Lawlor v. Zook, No. 2:15-CV-113, 2016
WL 9132935, at *44–45 (E.D. Va. Aug. 26, 2016), rev’d on other grounds, 909 F.3d
614 (4th Cir. 2018).
198. Jackson v. Dretke, 450 F.3d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 2006); see also United
States v. Snarr, 704 F.3d 368, 401 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Jackson, 450 F.3d at
618).
199. Jackson, 450 F.3d at 620 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
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Judge Dennis noted the Supreme Court in Payne found
defendants’ expansive rights to present mitigating
information to the jury to be a basis for expanding victim
survivors’ right to present evidence about the impact of the
murder on their lives. Judge Dennis reversed the equation:
“If the value of the victim’s life is permitted to be brought
before the jury, however, then I see no option under Supreme
Court jurisprudence but to permit the defendant to counter
this evidence with evidence of the value of his own life.” 200
One argument for admitting execution impact evidence,
therefore, is that it is simply fair, given the fact that the
victim’s family has the right to testify about the impact of the
loss of the victim on them.
2. Justice Requires Protecting Innocents
While Judge Dennis drew on ideas of equity and fair play
as a reason to admit the evidence, jurors may see the
evidence as essential to assessing the moral stakes of their
decision. This evidence
powerfully conveys to the jurors that their death verdict will affect
other members of their community. EIE permits jurors to recognize
in a visceral way that their capital decision does not occur in a
vacuum—that the life they may decide to take perhaps has had, and
perhaps will continue to have, some positive effect on others. 201

Not only does EIE permit the jury to appreciate the
defendant’s positive impact on his loved ones, but also these
loved ones’ suffering. As a juror who participated in the
200. Id. at 621.
201. Logan, supra note 193, at 52. Logan also notes this consideration of the
defendant’s family arises in non-capital contexts. Id. at 50–51 & n.266 (first citing
People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Ill. 1997) (imposition of probationary term
rather than prison because of family impact); then Edgecomb v. State, 673 N.E.2d
1185, 1199 (Ind. 1996) (hardship of incarceration on children mitigating); and
then State v. Mirakaj, 632 A.2d 850, 851 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993)
(reversing non-capital sentence because lower court failed to consider impact on
defendant’s children)). Oral histories of individuals affected by the death penalty
and the execution of a friend or family member can be found at The Texas After
Violence Project website, https://shelteringjustice.texasafterviolence.org/.

2021]

THE COMPLEXITIES OF CONSCIENCE

1293

Capital Juror Project explained, “I think that was the most
mitigating thing that would lead us away from the death
penalty—just how it was devastating to [the defendant’s
family]. That basically, having him put to death is just going
to create more victims.” 202
Joshua Kleinfeld reflects on the very problem of creating
more victims in articulating his principles of democratic
criminal justice. He identifies the importance of “prosocial
punishment” that “protect[s], repair[s], and reconstruct[s]
the normative order violated by a crime while at the same
time minimizing the damage to the normative order caused
by punishment itself.” 203 Part of our normative order is our
reluctance to hurt innocent people. 204 In discussing Capital
Jury Project research, Kleinfeld observes that jurors’
attention to the innocent “evince[es] not just a sentiment or
emotion, but a certain kind of moral position”; 205 namely that
it is wrong to hurt innocent people.
Jurors would hardly be alone in reflecting on the impact
of punishment on others. While empiricism rather than
moral philosophy drive this research, “Focal Concerns”
theorists have explored the ways in which judges integrate
considerations other than the traditional punishment
frameworks of retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation. 206
The defendant’s blameworthiness—the crime’s seriousness,
the defendant’s prior criminal history, role in the crime,
background of victimization by parents or others—and his
future dangerousness to the community are certainly
important to judges. In addition, however, empirical
202. Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital
Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1155 (1997).
203. Joshua Kleinfeld, Three Principles of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111
NW. U. L. REV. 1455, 1479 (2017).
204. Kleinfeld, supra note 23, at 1094, 1099.
205. Id. at 1139.
206. See, e.g., Darrell Steffensmeier, Jeffery Ulmer & John Kramer, The
Interaction of Race, Gender, and Age in Criminal Sentencing: The Punishment
Cost of Being Young, Black, and Male, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 763, 767 (1998).
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research indicates that judges also consider the “practical
constraints and consequences” of sentences. 207 These may
include how a sentence might affect a defendant’s children or
other family members. 208 When jurors bring to deliberations
their interpretations of local norms and community concerns,
they are, of course, fulfilling their constitutional role. Both
theory and data indicate that a common, and commonsense,
norm is to consider the effects of a sentence on others.
B. Exclusion of Co-Participant’s Non-Death Sentence
1. Legal Debate
Sentences received by other participants in the crime are
also often excluded from capital sentencing hearings. State
courts and the federal circuits are divided with respect to the
admissibility of a co-participant’s non-death sentence in the

207. Id.; see also Darrell Steffensmeier & Stephen Demuth, Ethnicity and
Sentencing Outcomes in U.S. Federal Courts: Who is Punished More Harshly?, 65
AM. SOCIO. REV. 705, 709 (2000). These “practical constraints and consequence”
concerns include judicial preoccupations (such as the impact of a sentence on
their relationships within the court community of prosecutors, defense attorneys,
and judges, and the judge’s career concerns). Darrell Steffensmeier & Stephen
Demuth, Ethnicity and Judges’ Sentencing Decision: Hispanic-Black-White
Comparisons, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 145, 151 (2001). These concerns would not be
shared by the jurors as they are not repeat-players. See Marc Galanter, Why the
“Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 95, 100 (1974). For a discussion of how jurors share at least some of
judges’ focal concerns, see Mary R. Rose & Meredith Martin Rountree, The Focal
Concerns of Jurors Evaluating Mitigation: Evidence from Federal Capital Jury
Forms, LAW & SOC’Y REV. (forthcoming) (on file with authors).
208. Steffensmeier & Demuth, supra note 207, at 709. Because execution
impact evidence is a kind of focal concern, and because Focal Concerns theorists
highlight the fact that these concerns contribute to racial stratification in
sentencing, we analyzed our data for a race effect. We found no evidence that
jurors are more likely to have EIE presented in cases involving White defendants.
Race of the defendant shows only a marginally significant relationship to whether
jurors consider EIE in the case (p < .06), with patterns suggesting that it is the
“Other Race” category that were more likely to have at least one EIE mitigator
(i.e., 52% of all cases had EIE, but 70% of cases with a non-Black or non-White
defendant had EIE). The majority of defendants in the “Other Race” category
were Latino (n = 29 of 37 defendants).
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trial of another co-participant. 209 Proponents of this evidence
argue that this information provides essential information
about how another jury assessed the crime and gauged the
interactions of the participants. 210 The United States
Congress believed this was sufficiently relevant to
sentencing that it listed it as a “Mitigating Factor” the jury
“shall consider” in sentencing. 211
The conventional argument against admitting evidence
of a co-participant’s sentence is that “each capital defendant
is unique, and the jury is called upon to render a sentencing
decision unique to that defendant.” 212 Evidence about others’
sentences merely serve to distract the jury from its proper
function to determine which sentence this defendant should
receive. 213
While state or federal law may permit the introduction
of the co-participant’s more lenient sentence, whether the
Eighth Amendment compels its admission is a different
question. Eighth Amendment arguments for admitting this
evidence stem from Parker v. Dugger, in which the Supreme
Court characterized a co-participant’s lenient sentence as
mitigating evidence. 214 Opponents of this evidence have
argued the Supreme Court simply drew on Florida law in
Parker and did not adjudicate the Eighth Amendment

209. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Beyond Compare? A Codefendant’s Prison
Sentence as a Mitigating Factor in Death Penalty Cases, 71 FLA. L. REV. 1017,
1038 (2019) (collecting cases admitting and excluding co-participant non-death
sentences).
210. Id. at 1054.
211. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(4) (“In determining whether a sentence of death is to
be imposed on a defendant, the finder of fact shall consider any mitigating factor,
including the following: . . . Another defendant or defendants, equally culpable in
the crime, will not be punished by death.”).
212. David McCord & Mark W. Bennett, The Proposed Capital Penalty Phase
Rules of Evidence, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 417, 448 (2014).
213. Id.
214. 498 U.S. 308, 315 (1991).
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question. 215
The argument against admissibility tracks familiar
lines. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, for example,
rejected the relevance of this evidence, stating:
We do not see how the conviction and punishment of a co-defendant
could mitigate appellant’s culpability in the crime. Each defendant
should be judged by his own conduct and participation and by his
own circumstances. If evidence of a co-defendant’s convictions and
punishment were admissible, why not the convictions in all other
capital murders and the punishment in those cases? We do not
believe this is what the right to present mitigating circumstances
to the jury was meant to include. The law contemplates evidence
personal to the accused, not comparisons with the convictions and
punishments of other defendants. 216

By this logic, if the evidence does not relate directly to
the defendant, it is not relevant to his sentence.
2. Fairness Requires Equitable Sentencing
A just sentence can require attention to consistency in
punishment, including whether similarly or more culpable
people have not been punished as severely as the government
seeks to punish the defendant in his particular case. Jeffrey
L. Kirchmeier argues that, not only should a co-participant’s
sentence be admitted because it is a “circumstance of the
offense,” but also because it sounds in the Supreme Court’s
concerns regarding retribution, deterrence, proportionality,

215. See, e.g., Edwards v. State, 200 S.W.3d 500, 510 (Mo. 2006), as modified
on denial of reh’g (“Parker holds that any mitigating evidence that is admitted
under state law must be considered and weighed against the aggravating factors
found. The United States Supreme Court does not say that an accomplice’s
sentence is constitutionally required mitigating evidence; rather, the Court says
that if that evidence is admitted under state law, then it must be considered by
the sentencer.”); Morris v. State, 940 S.W.2d 610, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996);
State v. Ward, 449 S.E.2d 709, 737 (N.C. 1994) (same); People v. Mincey, 827 P.2d
388, 434 (Cal. 1992).
216. Evans v. State, 656 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); see also Joubert
v. State, 235 S.W.3d 729, 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Morris, 940 S.W.2d
at 613).
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and fairness in sentencing. 217 “[H]orizontal equity,” where
comparable offenders receive comparable punishment, is
just. 218
Co-participants’ sentences can also implicate more than
just a circumstance of the offense and proportionality.
Sentence disparities reflect the sometimes unseemly horsetrading involved in multi-party prosecutions. The coparticipant’s lower sentence might be more attributable to
the nitty-gritty of criminal prosecutions, where someone’s
lower sentence might reflect his cooperation with law
enforcement or his lawyer’s ability to make a better deal with
the prosecutor, than to his own culpability. 219 We return to
the jurors’ interest in the prosecution in the next Section.
C. Exclusion of Government Negligence
1. Legal Debate
While a less discrete area of litigation, our data indicated
striking juror support for government negligence
mitigation. 220 Verdict forms contained essentially three
types of evidence regarding government negligence. Most
common was evidence involving the government’s failure to,
for example, remove the defendant from his abusive home or

217. Kirchmeier, supra note 209, at 1045–53.
218. Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1269–70 (2005).
219. See, e.g., R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory
Can Teach Us About A Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to “Seek Justice”, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 635, 654 (2006) (“[P]lea bargaining in criminal cases is almost
completely unregulated as a matter of professional responsibility.”); Daniel
Richard Stockmann, Understanding the Process of Defending Gang Crime Cases,
in STRATEGIES FOR DEFENDING GANG CRIMES *9 (Thompson Reuters/Aspatore
2013), 2013 WL 2727658 (Cooperating co-defendant “may be . . . giving
information the officers want to hear just to strike a deal or even because they
were threatened if they failed to cooperate.”); Daniel A. Hochheiser, Strategy,
Tips, and Tactics: Defending Gang Crime Cases, in STRATEGIES FOR DEFENDING
GANG CRIMES *4 (Thompson Reuters/Aspatore 2013), 2013 WL 2727655.
220. See supra Section I.C.3.

1298

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

put him in special education classes. Defense efforts to admit
this evidence are unlikely to provoke much resistance from
the prosecution or the court. These failures clearly help
jurors understand the defendant’s childhood and how he
became someone who could commit the crime for which they
just convicted him. This evidence is in the heartland of
Lockett and Eddings. Developing and presenting this
evidence is an essential part of competent capital defense
representation. 221
We saw another theory of government negligence that
implicates the defendant’s mens rea for the crime. In
Kenneth Wilk’s unusual case, the jury considered whether
the police conduct during a raid on Wilk’s home might have
contributed to Wilk’s shooting a law enforcement officer. 222
They were asked to vote on the following assertion:
“Although not sufficient to establish self-defense, the
following factors may have contributed to Mr. Wilk’s reaction
when the police forcibly entered his home,” followed by a
range of considerations, such as the defendant’s hearing loss,
prior experience with harassment at his home, poor visibility
inside the home, but also the fact that “the entry team was
not in full police uniform.” 223 As an additional mitigating
factor, jurors wrote in (and ten voted for): “The manner in
which the search & arrest warrants were planned & carried
out.” 224 As with the information about the defendant’s
childhood, whether to admit evidence supporting the
contention that government conduct contributed to the
homicide is not controversial. This is evidence of the
“circumstances of the offense,” contemplated by Lockett, that
reduces personal culpability.

221. See Am. Bar Ass’n, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Def. Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 1021–26 (2003).
222. Special Verdict Form at 7, United States v. Wilk, No. 04-60216-CR (S.D.
Fla. Apr. 19, 2005).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 10 (Item F).
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The most intriguing type of government negligence
evidence involves mitigators that have little to nothing to do
with the defendant’s personal culpability, instead focusing
on the role government action or inaction played in
permitting the crime to happen. This latter type of evidence
is legally more contested.
In one case, the defendant sought to present evidence
that the U.S. Army shared responsibility for the death of his
daughter, because it was aware that he had previously
abused his daughter. The district court rejected his
argument. Not only, the court held, is third-party negligence
not listed as a mitigator in the Federal Death Penalty Act,
but the catch-all provision, “any other circumstance of the
offense that mitigate[s] against imposition of the death
sentence,” 225 was also inapt.
[T]hat the U.S. Army had notice of [the victim’s] abuse is not a
“circumstance” of Defendant’s offense of child abuse murder and
murder . . . . That is, the U.S. Army was not involved in the offense
conduct, and its notice of any abuse does not in any way lessen
and/or explain Defendant’s conduct in carrying out the offense. 226

In another case, the defense sought to present evidence
that the defendant had called the FBI to tell them that he
felt “out of control.” 227 He said that he was wanted by law
enforcement and he not only proposed a time and place to
surrender, but he actually showed up at that time and
place. 228 The FBI, however, failed to respond. 229 The trial
court found these “allegations of ‘contributory negligence’ by
third parties” not relevant as mitigation: “[T]he Court is not

225. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(8).
226. United States v. Williams, Crim. No. 06-00079 JMS/KSC, 2014 WL
2436199, at *4 (D. Haw. May 30, 2014).
227. United States v. Sampson, Crim. Action No. 01-10384-LTS, 2016 WL
11573524, at *5 (D. Mass. May 13, 2016).
228. Id.
229. Id. The defendant’s call reportedly dropped, and the FBI employee who
took the call did not pass the defendant’s information along. Id.
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persuaded such facts are reasonably viewed as mitigating or
diminishing [Defendant’s] culpability for his crimes.” 230
Governmental responsibility for creating the specific
circumstances that may have given rise to a crime is
particularly relevant to homicide cases occurring in prisons,
an environment the government tightly controls. While the
federal verdict forms discussed above allow us to see how
jurors respond to evidence about government failings, not all
jurors have the opportunity to consider it. In one federal
prosecution of a prison homicide, for example, the
government asked the court to “preclude the defendants from
offering evidence or argument regarding any violation of any
official BOP policy or procedure that may have contributed
to the defendants’ ability to carry out the assault” 231 on the
victim. The district court granted the government’s motion
in part, stating that “merely because the killing of [the
victim] was made feasible by perceived deficiencies in BOP
policies or personnel has no bearing on the guilt of the
Defendants. Hence, Defendants will not be permitted to use
alleged BOP employee negligence as a smokescreen.” 232
This issue has also arisen in state court cases. The trial
court in Eaglin v. Florida 233 denied the defendant the
opportunity to introduce “evidence of security lapses and
supervision and systems failures at the prison as
mitigation.” 234 The Florida Supreme Court upheld the trial
court’s decision, finding the prison’s negligence did “not
reduce the moral culpability of Eaglin for the murders.” 235 In
Williams v. State, the defendant argued the court should

230. Id.
231. Gov’t’s Response to Defs.’ Motion for Admissibility of Evidence in Civ. Law
Suit & Motion in Limine at 3, United States v. Cramer, No. 1:16-CR-26, 2018 WL
3819992 (E.D. Tex. May 30, 2018).
232. Id.
233. 19 So. 3d 935 (Fla. 2009).
234. Id. at 943.
235. Id. at 944.
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allow him to present evidence of the Arkansas Department
of Correction’s negligence in handling him. 236 The Arkansas
Supreme Court disagreed, reciting the Lockett/Eddings
framework:
Where the offered evidence of mitigation has nothing to do with a
criminal defendant’s character, record, background, history,
condition, or the circumstances of his crime, it is not relevant on the
issue of punishment. Williams’s argument is essentially that
because the Department of Correction knew he was a violent man,
it should have protected him against himself by assuring he did not
escape and that somehow the alleged negligence of the Department
of Correction diminished Williams’s responsibility for the carnage
he wreaked upon his escape. 237

The court concluded that because the evidence “does not
have any tendency to diminish Williams’s responsibility,” it
was not mitigating and therefore not admissible. 238
2. Blaming Requires Moral Standing
The uneasiness with prosecutorial ethics we raised with
respect to co-participant sentencing raises a subtler moral
consideration that is squarely presented by evidence of
government negligence. In these cases, the facts in no way
excuse the defendant’s own actions. Instead they raise the
question whether the government’s “unclean hands”
compromised its “moral authority to hold another person
wholly responsible for a wrongful act.” 239
Victor Tadros has addressed the power of the State to
blame (and punish) those individuals it has failed
generally. 240 His theory can help us understand the possible

236. 67 S.W.3d 548, 562 (Ark. 2002).
237. Id. at 563.
238. Id.
239. Atiq & Miller, supra note 25, at 187–89 (punctuation and emphasis
omitted); see also Gustavo A. Beade, Who Can Blame Whom? Moral Standing to
Blame and Punish Deprived Citizens, 13 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 271, 277–78 (2019).
240. See generally Victor Tadros, Poverty and Criminal Responsibility, 43 J.
VALUE INQUIRY 391 (2009).
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reasoning underlying jurors’ votes on specific State failures.
Tadros observes that “[i]t is one thing to say about a person
that she is responsible for the action she performs. It is
another thing to say that we are entitled to hold her
responsible for her actions.” 241 Tadros frames this
entitlement to blame as the blamer’s “standing.” The
blamer’s entitlement to blame is diminished where it “is in
some way at fault for the occurrence of the wrongful
conduct.” 242
R.A. Duff approached the question by reflecting on how
blaming relates to the normative community: “Blame
requires a suitable relationship between blamer and blamed,
as fellow members of a normative community whose business
the wrong is: it is an attempt at moral communication,
appealing to values by which blamer and blamed are,
supposedly, mutually bound.” 243 Duff compares being
reproached by a friend and by a stranger. We take the
friend’s reproach more seriously than the stranger’s, because
we share a normative community with our friend. By
contrast, we don’t have to explain or justify ourselves to
strangers. 244
Taking the analysis a step further, Duff poses the
hypothetical where Ian has stolen money from his and
Hilda’s roommate, but Hilda gave him the idea. If Hilda
subsequently allies herself with the roommate and seeks to
call Ian to account, Ian may bridle. Ian does not “deny
wrongdoing, or claim that Hilda’s behaviour justified or
excused his; his claim is, rather, that it calls into question
her standing to call him to answer to her for his
wrongdoing.” 245 Since she had a role in his actions, however
241. Id. at 394.
242. Id. at 399.
243. R. A. Duff, Blame, Moral Standing and the Legitimacy of the Criminal
Trial, 23 RATIO 123, 125 (2010).
244. See id. at 125.
245. Id. at 126–27.
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passively, she compromised her moral authority to blame
him. She may regain it by acknowledging her own failures,
however. 246
Capital sentencing, fundamentally a proceeding in which
the government seeks to demarcate the defendant—the
blamed—as someone so outside the normative community
that he must be executed, inevitably forces the jury to ask,
“who are you to make this claim?” In this instance, we see
the community as the roommate who needs to confront Hilda
(the government) for enabling thieving Ian (the defendant).
It is crucial for the government to share with the jury a
normative community, a sense of values and morality, so
that the jury can trust it when it says the defendant must be
expelled from it. The government can regain its moral
authority by acknowledging its role. In failing to do that, it
fails to be part of the normative community. Put another
way, the jurors may see the government failure as a kind of
contributory fault, as if the jury were saying: “Because the
government contributed to what happened, it’s not fair for it
to then seek the ultimate penalty against the defendant.”
These moral intuitions—about protecting the innocent,
ensuring equitable and proportionate punishment, and
insisting on the moral standing of the prosecution—help
explain the federal verdict data and also emphasize the
stakes of the legal question. The data show that jurors
identify the moral relevance of this kind of evidence. This
evidence is vital for the jurors to perform their constitutional
normative role.
V. THE PATH FORWARD
In this Part, we propose rules for admitting this evidence
that rely on general principles for considering the moral
relevance of purported mitigation. The evidence is relevant
if it is specific to the defendant and his situation and maps
246. See id. at 127–29.
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onto larger normative ideas of justice and fairness. Where a
juror could reasonably find the proffered evidence carries
moral weight, that evidence is mitigating. In articulating
what we believe courts should consider, however, we must
also be clear that our proposal is not an invitation to
arbitrariness, impermissible sympathy, or caprice. Instead,
it increases justice by enabling jurors to bring to bear the
fullness of their moral decision.
Acknowledging moral commitments to justice and
fairness that are consistent with coherent theories of moral
decision-making is not an invitation to arbitrariness. 247 In
fact, it is harmonious with the Court’s interest in reducing
arbitrariness. 248 As Chad Flanders recently argued, the
Court’s concern with arbitrariness in death sentencing is
best understood as an effort to reduce the number of people
who should not be sentenced to death who nevertheless
are. 249 As “the Court has shown its preference for avoiding
giving the death penalty to a person who may deserve it,” 250
it follows that it also favors expanding the scope of
information available to the jury to consider in mitigation.
247. While the Court has generally characterized the eligibility determination
as ensuring the death penalty is not meted out in an arbitrary and capricious
way, it has also discussed it in the context of jury instructions for the selection
decision. See Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275–76 (1998); Saffle v. Parks,
494 U.S. 484, 484 (1990) (citing California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987))
(“The State must not cut off full and fair consideration of mitigating evidence; but
it need not grant the jury the choice to make the sentencing decision according to
its own whims or caprice.”).
248. See Chad Flanders, What Makes the Death Penalty Arbitrary? (And Does
It Matter If It Is?), 55 WISC. L. REV. 55, 87–102 (2019) (describing how the
Supreme Court has sought to reduce arbitrariness by requiring jury to find
aggravating factors, structuring jury decision-making to require consideration of
mitigation as well as aggravation, and prohibiting the death penalty for nonhomicidal crimes, and for offenders under 18 years old, with intellectual
disability, or acting with less than reckless mens rea).
249. See id. at 80–83, 90; see also id. at 98 (“If there is a risk of arbitrarily
overprotecting, this is better than a risk of arbitrarily underprotecting. Intrinsic
arbitrariness says: do not give the jury the possibility of assessing the death
penalty to someone who does not deserve it.”)
250. Id. at 88.
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The Court in McCleskey v. Kemp specifically contrasted “the
carefully defined standards that must narrow a sentencer’s
discretion to impose the death sentence,” with the
constitutionally mandated “limits [on] a State’s ability to
narrow a sentencer’s discretion to consider relevant evidence
that might cause it to decline to impose the death
sentence.” 251
Nor do the principles of moral decision-making we
discuss trade in “mere sympathy.” 252 In California v. Brown,
the Court upheld jury instructions that told the jury “it must
not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy,
passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.” The
instruction appropriately reminded jurors to focus on the
evidence rather than “extraneous emotional factors.” 253
Justice O’Connor in her concurrence contrasted the
impermissible “emotional response to the mitigation
evidence” with the jurors’ “moral inquiry” into the
defendant’s culpability.” 254 This Article promotes only the
latter.
In another challenge to an anti-sympathy instruction,
the Court explained that while Lockett and Eddings “place
clear limits on the ability of the State to define the factual
bases upon which the capital sentencing decision must be
made,” 255 the prisoner wanted something different. Rather
than asking to expand “what mitigating evidence the jury
must be permitted to consider in making its sentencing
decision,” he wanted to prohibit “how it must consider the
mitigating evidence.” 256 Our argument for providing the
jurors with evidence regarding execution impact, sentence
equity, and government negligence or malfeasance falls
251. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 304 (1987).
252. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542 (1987).
253. Id. at 543.
254. Id. at 545 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
255. See Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 490 (1990).
256. Id.
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squarely within the “what,” rather than the “how,” the Court
permits.
Finally, the evidence discussed in this Article does not
cater to jurors’ “whims or caprice.” 257 Our reading of the
Court’s Lockett cases would not compel admission of evidence
based on a juror’s beliefs in, for example, astrology, “an
empty concept to be filled by whatever a lawyer or court
thinks might persuade a single juror in a particular case.” 258
The linchpin of our argument is that a reasoned moral
response requires attention to how we reason about moral
decisions. Our data make clear that the kinds of evidence we
discuss here do not speak to empty concepts or the single
idiosyncratic juror or case. Instead, the data show patterns
of significant juror support across cases that signal a more
complex—and morally indispensable—reasoning at work.
Instead of “transform[ing] mitigation from a moral concept
to a predictive one,” 259 our interpretation of the cases
reinvigorates the moral content of the jury’s decision.
A. Admit Execution Impact Evidence
In formulating this proposal, we take our guidance from
the data. The jurors are telling us that they care about the
effects of the defendant’s execution on his loved ones. The
moral considerations we outlined, however—the moral
resistance to hurting innocents—could at least theoretically
apply far beyond the friends and family of the defendant.
Should jurors be able to hear from correctional officers,
wardens, reporters, and others whose contact with the death

257. Id. at 493.
258. United States v. Gabrion, 719 F.3d 511, 522 (6th Cir. 2013); see also
United States v. Fell, 531 F.3d 197, 219 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[Constitutional and]
evidentiary standards do not mean that the defense has carte blanche to
introduce any and all evidence that it wishes.” (citing United States v. Purkey,
428 F.3d 738, 756 (8th Cir. 2005)).
259. Gabrion, 719 F.3d at 522.
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penalty will distress them in general? 260 We believe they
should not. Our argument regarding admissibility is guided
by the conjunction of moral principle and empirical data but
is also informed by Court’s concern for individualization.
Admitting testimony from these witnesses because a juror
might find them compelling threatens to turn capital
sentencing proceedings into trials about the morality of the
death penalty in general. The juror’s role in the post-Gregg
era is to decide the morality of the death penalty for this
individual. Therefore, execution impact evidence should be
limited to evidence about how the execution of this specific
person will affect them. The defendant must play a concrete
role in that prospective witness’s life. 261 This rule parallels
victim impact evidence: although we might weep for the
victim of a murder we do not know, we cannot testify at trial,
no matter how acutely we may feel the loss of the victim. For
both those affected by the murder and by the execution, only
the “specific harm caused” should be admitted. 262
B. Inform Juries of Co-Participant Sentences
As mentioned above, admitting evidence of a coparticipant’s sentence could turn the defendant’s sentencing
into a mini-trial on the co-participant’s just deserts. Further,
the co-participant’s just desert may be wholly irrelevant to
the defendant’s role in the crime. For example, what if the
co-participant received a non-death sentence because of his

260. See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, Death Penalty Can Be Hard on Those Who Carry It
Out, https://www.pulitzer.org/article/death-penalty-can-be-hard-those-who-carry
-it-out (last visited Dec. 21, 2021).
261. Courts should recognize, however, how being in custody shapes
relationships. The stringent limits jails and prisons place on relationships mean
that people have to rely on different ways to connect. Powerful relationships can
be forged through correspondence and occasional visits. The courts’ role is not to
assess the bonds between the defendant and another person, but only to
determine that a personal connection specific to this particular defendant exists.
262. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).
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intellectual disability? 263 (People with intellectual
disabilities are excluded from the death penalty.) 264 That coparticipant received that lower sentence because he is “less
morally culpable” 265 in a way that is wholly irrelevant to the
defendant’s own culpability.
In responding to these concerns, we borrow from the
practice of written victim impact statements, which
prosecution and defense lawyers commonly negotiate and
courts review. 266 This co-participant sentencing statement
would simply tell the jury what sentence the co-defendant
received and the parties would have the opportunity to
supply the jury—in this written statement—a concise
description of the relevant evidence. This would be the
prosecution’s opportunity to state that the co-participant’s
sentencer considered, for example, any intellectual
disability, and the defense’s chance to describe evidence
regarding the co-participant’s actions and any benefits the
co-participant might have received in exchange, for example,
for his cooperation. Reducing the account of the coparticipant’s sentencing to a sentencing statement addresses
concerns regarding the potential for a mini-trial and allows
both parties to advance their arguments about what
constitutes justice in this case. 267 The prosecution and
263. We thank Jordan M. Steiker for this reminder.
264. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
265. Id. at 320.
266. See, e.g., Bush v. Carpenter, 926 F.3d 644, 658 (10th Cir. 2019), cert.
denied sub nom. 140 S. Ct. 2770 (2020); United States v. Henderson, 485 F. Supp.
2d 831, 849 (S.D. Ohio 2007); United States v. McVeigh, 958 F. Supp. 512, 514–
15 (D. Colo. 1997).
267. Courts have generally found that defendants do not have a right to
confront witnesses against them during the so-called “selection” phase of the
trial. See State v. Martinez, 303 P.3d 627, 630–31 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013) (noting
that federal circuit courts and most state courts find Confrontation Clause does
not apply to sentencing); United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 325–26 (5th Cir.
2007) (“Confrontation Clause does not operate to bar the admission of testimony
relevant only to a capital sentencing authority’s selection decision.”); United
States v. Umana, 750 F.3d 320, 348 (4th Cir. 2014) (similar observation); see also
McCord & Bennett, supra note 212, at 493 (“[T]he eligibility phase presents a
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defense can each argue why the co-participant’s sentence is
or is not a meaningful signal regarding the defendant’s just
deserts.
C. Admit Evidence of Government Negligence
As we note above, most evidence relating to government
failures is admitted as part of the defendant’s background. If
a person acted out because the government failed to provide
them with adequate educational or health services, for
example, the evidence would fall well within the
Lockett/Eddings framework. Whether this failure “lessen[s]
and/or explain[s] Defendant’s conduct in carrying out the
offense” 268 or “diminish[es] [his] culpability” 269 should not be
the test, however. The write-ins, but especially the BOP
cases, enable us to tease out government failure as a distinct
form of juror reasoning. We propose that evidence that the
government’s acts or omissions contributed to the offense
should be admissible, just as evidence relating to the
government failures shaping the defendant’s background is
admissible. Therefore, where, as in Naeem Williams’s case,
the U.S. Army knew he was abusing the child he would later
kill, the jury should be informed of the government’s
knowledge. 270 This in no way excuses Williams’s conduct, but
one can readily see how a jury could question the
government’s moral standing to seek the ultimate
punishment.

traditional legal issue of proof of an aggravating circumstance which is quite
amenable to requiring compliance with the Confrontation Clause, while the
selection phase ultimately presents a moral issue of what sentence the defendant
deserves.”).
268. United States v. Williams, Crim. No. 06-00079 JMS/KSC, 2014 WL
2436199, at *4 (D. Haw. May 30, 2014).
269. United States v. Sampson, Crim. Action No. 01-10384-LTS, 2016 WL
11573524, at *3 (D. Mass. May 13, 2016) (quoting United States v. Gabrion, 719
F.3d 511, 524 (6th Cir. 2013)).
270. Williams, 2016 WL 11573524, at *4.
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CONCLUSION
We contend the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence does and should permit introduction of
evidence that does not speak directly to the offender or his
offense but relates instead to the complex moral decision
capital jurors make. This position emerges from our
understanding of the Court’s definition of mitigation as one
that emphasizes a broader “reasoned moral” decision rather
than one tied narrowly to the Lockett/Eddings focus on the
offender and the offense. It is consistent with the direction of
the Court’s mitigation decisions and the appropriate role of
the jury. The Court’s insight in Woodson—that mandatory
sentencing wreaks unfairness because it fails to acknowledge
the complexity and variety of human experiences and
“frailties”—has gradually expanded to comprehend a broader
definition of mitigation to meet the Court’s commitment to
the jury’s normative role.
The kinds of mitigation that some courts have rejected—
execution impact evidence, sentences for co-participants, and
governmental negligence—reflect principles that legal and
social scientific scholars have identified as part and parcel of
moral determinations, particularly sentencing. They are
calling on “alternative moral principles” 271 to those
permitted by those courts who read Lockett and Eddings as
fixing the boundaries of relevant mitigation. The federal jury
verdicts forms provide a singular perspective onto what
matters to jurors and demonstrate there is more at stake in
sentencing than a defendant’s individual culpability. Our
data demonstrate jurors attend to more complex aspects of
the sentencing decision than simply the characteristics of the
offender and the circumstances of the offense. Lower courts
err when they cling to a conceptually outdated and unduly
restrictive definition of relevance, one which our data show
is out of step with jurors’ moral sensibilities.

271. Atiq & Miller, supra note 25, at 170.
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Our empirical findings are particularly striking, given
what we know about the process through which capital
jurors are selected. The procedure, commonly called “death
qualification,” ensures that only those who could sentence
someone to death are seated as jurors. 272 So-called “deathqualified” jurors are less likely to be women, people with low
incomes, people of color, Jews, and Catholics. 273 They are
also more likely to be punitive, harbor prejudiced attitudes,
and identify more with victims and less with defendants
(about whom they hold unfavorable attitudes). 274 With
respect to how they approach the questions they must
specifically consider in a capital trial, death-qualified jurors
are more likely to endorse aggravating factors and find them
more aggravating than non-death-qualified jurors. In
addition, not only are they less likely to endorse mitigators,
they also find them less mitigating—and sometimes even
find them aggravating—when compared to non-deathqualified mock jurors. 275 In other words, capital jurors are
not bleeding-heart liberals. There is no reason to believe
these jurors would be unusually open to, or solicitous of,
mitigating evidence. In fact, just the opposite. These
underlying attitudes make the jurors’ expansive moral vision
particularly noteworthy.
With respect to EIE, it is plain that the defendant’s
family matters to capital jurors. But this attention to EIE
should not be seen as simply an add-on to the question of the
defendant’s moral blameworthiness. In considering a coparticipant’s sentence, jurors reflect on the appropriate
punishment for the defendant before them and weigh the
prospect of unfair disparities in sentencing. Government
272. Logan A. Yelderman, Monica K. Miller & Clayton D. Peoples, Capitalizing
Jurors: How Death Qualification Relates to Jury Composition, Jurors’
Perceptions, and Trial Outcomes, in ADVANCES IN PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 28 (B.H.
Bornstein & M.K. Miller eds., 2016).
273. Id. at 35–36.
274. Id. at 37–38.
275. Id. at 38.
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failures such as those we see in the BOP cases do not
diminish the defendant’s culpability. Does it really make us
think better of the defendant to know that he took advantage
of organizational dysfunction and incompetence? Yet jurors
do find this information mitigating, as if the jury were saying
the government is morally estopped from now claiming that
justice requires executing the defendant.
We have proposed principles and rules for admitting this
evidence that demonstrate that admitting this evidence
poses no insuperable logistical impediment. We believe these
will assist courts who confront evidence other than that
which we address here. Courts currently consider whether a
particular piece of evidence sheds light on the defendant’s
moral culpability insofar as that informs his sentence. We
shift the question only slightly to whether the evidence sheds
light on the justice of a death sentence for that defendant.
This shift enables courts to foreground the jury and how it
reaches its decision about what constitutes a just sentence.
Again, how it reaches its decision is not simply an empirical
matter. It cannot be enough that nine of ten mock jurors
respond to particular evidence. Why they find it important in
sentencing—what are the moral principles at stake as they
decide what is just—is the crucial inquiry.
Kent Scheidegger recently proposed a dramatic revision
of the Supreme Court’s mitigation jurisprudence. The
defendant should be permitted to present to the jury only the
facts of the crime, his lack of significant criminal history, and
his youth. 276
For everything else, restore to the people the ability to decide
through the democratic process which mitigating circumstances
have enough probative value to be worth the burden of litigating
them and then litigating whether defense counsel presented well
enough. The real Constitution does not transfer this decision from
the people to the judiciary, and it is high time to give back to the

276. Kent Scheidegger, Tinkering with the Machinery of Death: Lessons from a
Failure of Judicial Activism, 17 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 131, 166 (2019).
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people the authority that is rightfully theirs. 277

While Mr. Scheidegger refers to the democratic process
of the legislature, 278 he overlooks the democratic
contribution of the jury. Our data demonstrate that the
jurors took broad view of what constituted mitigating
evidence, taking far more into account more than the facts of
the crime, the defendant’s criminal history, and his age.
Indeed, they looked beyond the defendant and his personal
blameworthiness. Instead, they brought a more nuanced
view of the defendant as a person embedded within a larger
social context.
The judiciary, at least in some jurisdictions, may well be
taking power away from the jury, 279 but the relevant power
here, the “authority that is rightfully theirs,” is the capital
jurors’ authority in sentencing individual defendants.
Taking the jury seriously requires taking their normative
commitments seriously.

277. Id.
278. Id. at 133, 162.
279. See generally SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY (2016)
(arguing legal mechanisms such as motions for summary judgment and plea
agreements diminish the role of the jury).
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APPENDIX 280

280. Verdict, United States v. Richardson, No. 1:08-CR-139 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 26,
2012) (full form reproduced here in Appendix with juror names redacted).
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